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REINING IN “KNOCK AND TALK”
INVESTIGATIONS: USING MISSOURI v.
SEIBERT TO CURTAIL AN END-RUN AROUND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
“The quality of a nation’s civilization can be largely measured
by the methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal
law.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a single mother of three children.2 You are at
home cleaning up from dinner when there is a knock at the door.
Answering the knock reveals two police officers, each wearing shirts
with “Indiana Drug Enforcement” plainly visible. They ask to come in
and discuss a situation regarding your oldest son, age fourteen. Once
inside the home, the officers tell you that they have received information
that drugs are being sold out of your home, and they would like to look
around. You begin to sweat, unsure of what to do.3 So you nervously
ask what they are looking for, and the officers reply that they want to
look for drugs, drug paraphernalia, or other indications that drugs are
being sold. You decline their request for consent to search.
At this point the officers have a curious look on their faces. They ask
you why you would not agree to let them search for these items. Surely
you do not want your son selling drugs, and would want to correct any
missteps he takes right away. Alternatively, the officers hypothesize,
maybe you have something to hide. Is that it? Already nervous, you are
now in a state of near hysteria. Two police officers, with the power to

Chief Justice Warren made this statement in the majority opinion of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 480 (1966) (quoting Walter V. Shaefer, Federalism and State Criminal
Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26 (1956)).
2
This situation, while completely hypothetical, is a conglomeration of many different
fact patterns experienced during a summer spent clerking for the Honorable Dean A.
Colvin, Judge, Marshall County (Indiana) Superior Court #2. He is, without doubt, one of
the best legal mentors a law student could ask for. No inferences should be made that this
particular fact pattern actually happened, or regarding how Judge Colvin would rule
should this issue arise in the future.
3
Before this is casually dismissed as a dilemma facing someone with something to
hide, see Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 249-50
(2002). Strauss, a criminal procedure professor who knew what her rights were, felt
intimidated, nervous, and embarrassed when police came to her home to investigate her
son’s party. Id. (emphasis added). She revealed that the police showed no force, yet,
initially, she was unsure how she should proceed. Id.
1
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arrest you and remove your children, have accused you of hiding
something. You are unable to answer, so you just stare at them.
In response to your silence, the officers tell you that unless you agree
to let them search, they will remove all three of your children from your
home and take them to Child Protective Services. So you agree to let
them search; they produce a consent form and you sign it.
The police in this hypothetical have engaged in what is known as a
“knock and talk,” a procedure that is quickly becoming a popular
investigatory tool in the police arsenal.4 The police in this hypothetical
would not have been able to get a search warrant to search the home, yet
were able to exploit the situation in the home to get around the warrant
requirement by obtaining the consent of the homeowner.5
This Note will argue that when the “knock and talk” is used
manner, any fruits, or evidence obtained from the resulting
should be excluded as coming from the “poisonous tree,” or
search.6 First, in Part II, this Note discusses the development

in this
search
illegal
of the

4
The “knock and talk” is a tool used in police investigations where the police approach
a dwelling, without a search warrant, knock on the door, identify themselves as police
officers, ask to enter the home to “discuss” some police issue, and conduct a search of the
home after gaining the homeowner’s consent. Carrie Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner City:
Application of the Curtilage Doctrine to Urban and Suburban Areas, 15 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS.
L.J. 297, 311-12 (2005). These techniques were designed by police to conduct searches
without warrants and to generally avoid the protections offered by the Fourth
Amendment. Id. See infra note 14 for the appropriate text of the Fourth Amendment. The
“knock and talk” technique (no warrant present) is to be distinguished from “knock and
announce,” which refers to situations where the police already have a search warrant and are
serving that warrant on the homeowner. See generally Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385
(1997) (law enforcement does not even have to “knock” or “announce” in this circumstance
if the officer has reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that knocking and
announcing would be dangerous or futile or lead to the destruction of evidence).
5
Consent is not the only way a search can be conducted without a waiver. See JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 11.01-17.01, at 183-275 (3rd ed. 2002).
There are currently six exceptions (including consent) to the warrant requirement, and to
be valid, a warrantless search must meet all criteria of one of the exceptions. Id. Besides
consent, the other exceptions are: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) probable cause to
believe an automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime, (3) evidence in plain
view, (4) a “stop and frisk” search, and (5) hot pursuit, evanescent evidence, or other
emergency. Id. These exceptions are beyond the scope of this Note, and as such, detailed
explanations are foregone. However, for an excellent explanation of warrant exceptions,
see 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 4TH AMENDMENT (West 4th
ed. 2004) (1978).
6
Generally, evidence that law enforcement obtains illegally is inadmissible at criminal
trial. Further, all evidence obtained or derived by exploiting the illegally obtained
evidence is inadmissible as well. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). In
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“knock and talk” and the historical roots of consent searches.7 Then,
because the evolution of consent law relies on confession law, Part II
traces the development of the Miranda decision and its progeny.8 Part II
concludes with a discussion of the Missouri v. Seibert decision, which
forms one basis for the analysis portion of this Note.9 Then, Part III
presents an analysis of the “knock and talk” using the information
presented in Part II, while Part IV proposes a workable solution to
constitutional issues discussed in Part III.10
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSENT LAW—DOES NO REALLY MEAN NO?
Prior to 1991, no appellate case had ever used the phrase “knock and
talk” in connection with the consensual search of a home.11 But since
1991, the increased use of the phrase has corresponded to the increased
use of the technique, because police find that getting consent is far easier
than obtaining a search warrant.12
Indeed, excluding searches
subsequent to arrest, over ninety percent of searches conducted by police
without a warrant are conducted under the auspices of consent.13

the proceeding, the illegally obtained evidence is the “poisonous tree,” and the evidence
obtained by exploiting that evidence is the “fruit.” Id.
7
See infra notes 18-95 and accompanying text.
8
See infra notes 96-133 and accompanying text.
9
See infra notes 134-67 and accompanying text.
10
See infra notes 168-266 and accompanying text.
11
H. Morley Swingle & Kevin M. Zoellner, “Knock and Talk” Consent Searches: If Called by
a Panther, Don’t Anther, 55 J. MO. B. 25 (1999). Swingle and Zoellner found that the first
appellate case to mention the phrase was State v. Land, 806 P.2d 1156, 1156 n.4 (Or. App.
1991). Further, the police are able to approach the home because that area is outside of the
curtilage of the home in an area called the open field. See generally Hester v. United States,
265 U.S. 57 (1924) (the evaluation of this policy is outside the scope of this Note, and the
propriety of such will be left to other Notewriters).
12
See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.01, at 275 (citing RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, L. PAUL
SUTTON, & CHARLOTTE A. CARTER, THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS,
PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES 21 (Nat’l Center for State Courts 1984)) (quoting a police
officer frustrated by delays in getting a search warrant: “you say to yourself, ‘my God, you
know, if I’m putting you [the magistrate] out, you know, I’ll run back to the house and try
bargaining for consent, you know, ‘cause I can get that done.’”) (emphasis added).
13
See Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for
Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773 (2005); Rebecca Strauss, Note,
We Can Do this the Easy Way or the Hard Way: The Use of Deceit to Induce Consent Searches, 100
MICH. L. REV. 868, 871 (2002); see also State v. Kerwick, 512 So. 2d. 347, 349 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) (reporting testimony of officer patrolling the Amtrak station that they would
routinely search over 3,000 passenger bags per year after receiving consent); Harris v. State,
994 S.W.2d 927, 932 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (noting the police officer in the case asked
for consent to search every car he stopped, regardless of suspicion). Searches after arrests
are beyond the scope of this Note.
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However, an unreasonable search of a home is the chief problem the
Fourth Amendment seeks to eradicate.14
This part will begin by discussing the development of the subcategory of consent searches known as “knock and talk.”15 Second, the
legal history and development of consent searches is discussed, ending
with a discussion of the seminal case Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.16 Third,
because the Bustamonte Court leaned on the development of voluntary
confession law, Part III delves into the history of voluntary confession
cases, concluding with a discussion of the 2004 Supreme Court decision
in Missouri v. Seibert. 17
A. Knock and Talk Investigations
The typical “knock and talk” practice consists of officers knocking on
a resident’s door, identifying themselves, and requesting entry.18
The text of the Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 191 (1990) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall recognized that “physical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at
191 (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, East. Dist. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)); see
also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (quoting same); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) (holding the right of privacy was deemed too precious to
entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of
criminals); Hadl v. State, 47 S.W.3d 897, 902 (Ark. App. 2001) (“Indeed, physical intrusion
into the privacy of a person’s residence absent a warrant is the primary evil that the Fourth
Amendment seeks to eradicate.”); Leonetti, supra note 4, at 297 (“The sanctity of the home
and its immediate surroundings enjoys special solicitude in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.”).
15
See infra notes 18-39 and accompanying text.
16
412 U.S. 218 (1973); see infra notes 40-95 and accompanying text.
17
124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004); see infra notes 96-167 and accompanying text.
18
See Leonetti, supra note 4, at 311. This action alone is constitutional as a result of the
combination of the curtilege and open fields doctrines. The curtilege of the home is the
area immediately surrounding the home, the boundaries of which are usually clearly
marked, in which the homeowner maintains an expectation of privacy. See Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 (1984). Open fields, on the other hand, are the unoccupied
and undeveloped area outside of the curtilege. Id. at 178. Generally, the Court looks at
four factors when analyzing whether an area is in the curtilege or in an open field. See
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). Those four factors are: (1) the proximity of
the area to the home; (2) whether the area was within an enclosure surrounding the home;
(3) the nature of the uses to which the area was put; and (4) the steps taken to protect the
area from observation by passers-by. Id. But cf. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)
(discussing the knock at the door, either during the day or at night, as a prelude to a search
14

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss3/11

Waite: Reining in "Knock and Talk" Investigations: Using Missouri v. Se

2007]

Reining in “Knock and Talk” Investigations

1339

Usually, the officers are responding to an informant’s tip that there may
be drug activity at the house.19 Once inside, the officers inform the
resident that they are investigating suspected drug activity at the house
and ask for permission to search the home.20 If permission is granted,
the officers search the home and can seize potential evidence found
under the plain view doctrine; officers are authorized to take
incriminating evidence in their plain view.21
At the federal level, the “knock and talk” technique has been
generally recognized as a legitimate police method to obtain consent to
search a residence.22 However, some federal courts have asked whether
the police conduct has resulted in a “seizure” for Fourth Amendment
purposes.23 They focus on whether the occupant of the home would feel
free to leave the home or otherwise end the encounter.24 These courts,
generally disapproving of the technique, focus on the inherent
simply on the authority of the police as being inconsistent with “the basic constitutional
documents of English-speaking peoples”).
19
See Leonetti, supra note 4, at 312 (“The knock-and-talk has become extremely popular
with law enforcement agencies around the country, particularly in areas of high drug
activity.”). However, nothing prevents the police from engaging in this activity on a whim,
something that has been held a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27
(“The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at the
core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free society.”).
20
See Swingle & Zoellner, supra note 11, at 25. This Note focuses on the events
surrounding this request. Actual experience indicates that evidence obtained as a result of
the consent search often is admissible at trial as courts tend to side with law enforcement.
See LAFAVE, supra note 5, at 51.
21
See Swingle & Zoellner, supra note 11, at 312. The plain view doctrine is explained
merely by stating that an officer, legally present at the scene, may seize incriminating
evidence if it is in the officer’s plain view, including items not stated in the request for
consent. See LAFAVE, supra note 5, at 35.
22
See United States v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Johnson, 170
F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Powell, 929 F. Supp. 231, 232 (S.D. W. Va. 1996)
(noting while the potential for abuse is apparent, courts and commentators appear to
concur the practice can be lawful); United States v. Cruz, 838 F. Supp. 535, 543 (D. Utah
1993) (stating the “knock and talk” approach has been favorably recognized as a manner of
consent search).
23
Leonetti, supra note 4, at 313; see, e.g., Johnson, 170 F.3d at 720 (holding that a “knock
and talk” is unconstitutional because the officers detained the suspect without the
reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative stop); United States v. Jerez, 108
F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that the officers’ conduct amounted to a seizure based
on the Bostick standard).
24
This is known at the “free to leave” test. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). The
test holds that when a person is confronted by the police in a confined place, with restricted
freedom of movement, the appropriate inquiry for determining whether the encounter
constitutes a “seizure” is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the request
or otherwise end the encounter. Id. at 436. See infra notes 80-95 for a discussion of the
Bostick case.
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intimidation involved when multiple police officers approach a
residence late at night seeking a consent search.25 These circumstances
invariably convey the message to the homeowner that if consent is not
given, the police officers will simply get a warrant and return.26
By contrast, in state courts, “knock and talk” jurisprudence has
generally developed under one of two theories.27 The majority of states
place no further encumbrances on the technique, choosing to strictly
analyze the consent granted after police have entered the home.28 The
courts reason that the validity of “knock and talk” ultimately turns on
the validity of the consent granted to the searching police officer.29
Alternatively, some states have analyzed the procedure under
Fourth Amendment seizure law.30 This analysis has also led to the
technique being upheld.31 The courts reason that the resident is free to
end the encounter at any time, and therefore no “seizure” has taken
place. These courts analogize the “knock and talk” to the “free to leave
test.”32

Leonetti, supra note 4, at 314.
See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 67 S.W.3d 582 (Ark. 2002) (Brown, J., concurring). For federal
cases and the circumstances disallowing the “knock and talk,” see Johnson, 170 F.3d at 720
(declaring the “knock and talk” unconstitutional when officers detained the suspect
without the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop); United States
v. Conner, 127 F.3d 663 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding consent was not voluntary when it was
given in response to a “knock and talk” procedure in which four police officers knocked on
defendant’s motel room door, identified themselves as police, and ordered defendant to
“Open up”); and Jerez, 108 F.3d at 690 (stating that the officers’ conduct in engaging in a
late night “knock and talk” amounted to a seizure under the Bostick standard).
27
See generally Swingle & Zoellner, supra note 11, at 28.
28
See Hadl v. State, 47 S.W.3d 897, 898 (Ark. App. 2001) (ruling the “knock and talk”
procedure meets the requirements of the Arkansas Constitution); State v. Green, 598 So. 2d
624 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1992) (declaring the “knock and talk” search is not unlawful); People
v. Frohriep, 637 N.W.2d 562, 569 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (analyzing the search resulting from
a “knock and talk” under consent’s totality of the circumstances).
29
State v. Land, 806 P.2d 1156 (Or. App. 1991) (upholding a “knock and talk” search
based on consent jurisprudence).
30
See Frohriep, 637 N.W.2d at 567 (noting that for any “knock and talk” to have
constitutional ramifications a search or seizure must have taken place).
31
See State v. Smith, 488 S.E.2d 210, 214 (N.C. 1997) (holding that the “knock and talk”
procedure does not taint the consent or render the procedure a per se violation of the
Fourth Amendment).
32
The “free to leave test” comes from a Fourth Amendment seizure case, United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980), which declared that a person is seized under the
Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances, “a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave.”
25
26
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Conversely, other states have chosen to place additional burdens on
the police by requiring them to inform the consenter of his right to refuse
consent.33 These states override Bustamonte, which ruled that police are
not required to give notice of the occupant’s right to refuse the search on
state constitutional grounds.34 Courts in these states have placed
additional burdens on police attempting to search homes, reasoning that
the home is to be afforded additional protections from search and
seizure by police under their state constitutions due to the sanctity of the
home.35
A case that illustrates this principle is Washington v. Ferrier.36 In
Ferrier, the Washington Supreme Court held that before a signed consent
form will be upheld, the police engaging in a “knock and talk” must
notify a resident of her right to refuse to consent to the search.37 The fact
that the search took place in the home was central to the court’s analysis
of the consent granted in this case, and led the court to determine that
the “knock and talk” is inherently coercive to some degree.38 Therefore,
33
See Graves v. State, 708 So. 2d 858 (Miss. 1997) (stating consent gained through the use
of a “knock and talk” requires informed waiver); State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 68 (N.J.
1975) (ruling that the New Jersey Constitution required the police to inform the resident of
the right to refuse a search before consent was a valid exception to the warrant
requirement). See infra notes 36-39 for a discussion of State v. Ferrier.
34
See State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 932-33 (Wash. 1998) (“we conclude that the knock
and talk, as carried out here, violated Ferrier’s state constitutional right to privacy in her
home”). See infra notes 68-79 for the discussion of Bustamonte.
35
See Ferrier, 960 P.2d at 933 (stating the fact that the “knock and talk” took place in the
home was central to their analysis). Two examples from Ferrier and Johnson can be given.
The pertinent text of Washington’s Constitution reads: “No person shall be disturbed in his
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” WASH. CONST. art. 1 § 7.
The pertinent text of the New Jersey Constitution reads as follows: “The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 7.
36
Ferrier, 960 P.2d at 927. In Ferrier, police went to search Mrs. Ferrier’s house after they
received a tip from her son that she was growing marijuana in the home. Id. at 928. A total
of four officers of the Bremerton police force went to the home to engage in a “knock and
talk” because they did not believe they could get a search warrant. Id. The officers went to
Mrs. Ferrier’s home and asked to enter to discuss a problem with her son. Id. After the
officers were in the home they asked for consent to search. Id. At this point the testimony
of the officers differed significantly from the testimony of Mrs. Ferrier. Id. The officers
testified they went over a consent to search form and that Mrs. Ferrier signed it willingly.
Id. at 929. They did note, however, that she appeared nervous. Id. Mrs. Ferrier, on the
other hand, testified that the officers threatened to take her grandchildren to protective
services and that she only signed the consent form to prevent this from happening. Id.
Mrs. Ferrier testified that not only was she nervous, she was afraid as well. Id.
37
Id. at 938. The court went on to state that where police have ample opportunity to
obtain a warrant they would not look kindly on a failure to do so. Id. at 932.
38
Id. at 933. The court stated that in its opinion, the majority of people would not
question the lack of warrant because they either: (1) do not know one is required, (2) would
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the closer officers come to intruding a dwelling, the greater the
constitutional protection the Washington Constitution offers.39
B. The Consent Search—“Bargained” for or Freely Given?
The United States Supreme Court has often maintained that
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.40 However, a significant
exception to the warrant requirement is the consent search.41 In fact,
there are few areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that have
greater practical significance than consent searches.42 One particularly
troublesome aspect of consent law is how far the Supreme Court has
been willing to bend to allow police to conduct warrantless activity.43
This penchant is particularly bothersome when it comes to searches of a
residence, because the police tend to violate the sanctity of the home that
the Fourth Amendment ostensibly protects.44
feel inhibited from requesting, or (3) would be too stunned by the circumstances to make a
reasoned decision on whether to grant consent. Id.
39
Id. at 931. The court stated that in no area is a citizen more entitled to privacy than in
the home. Id.
40
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating, “searches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions”).
41
See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.01, at 275. As one officer explained, “there are a lot of
warrants that are not sought because of the hassle. You just figure it’s not worth the
hassle . . . . I don’t think you can forego a case because of the hassle of a search warrant,
but you can . . . work some other method. If I can get consent [to search], I’m gonna do it.”
VAN DUIZEND, SUTTON, & CARTER, supra note 12, at 21 (quoting DRESSLER, supra note 5,
§ 17.01, at 275).
42
See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.06, at 276 (stating a potentially troubling aspect of the
development of consent law is how far the Court is willing to bend to allow warrantless
consent searches); see also LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME:
THE LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 47-48 (2005) (describing the apparent double standard
courts employ when analyzing consent in the search context—positing pragmatic
information indicating consent is credited while pragmatic information indicating coercion
is discounted).
43
DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.06, at 276. A particularly pragmatic issue is how often
people grant consent even though they are well aware that incriminating evidence is
within the area to be searched. Strauss, supra note 3, at 212. Most reasonable people, it
would seem, would not consent to such a search. Id. Indeed, the District of Columbia
Circuit even had a rule—the no sane man rule—that stated that no sane man who denies
his guilt would actually be willing to allow policemen to search his room and discover
contraband. Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (holding that mere
acquiescence to a police search, absent some verbal indication to consent, does not
constitute consent when the resident is denying guilt).
44
See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 184 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The
right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the
individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from
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Despite the sanctity issue, the Court has maintained that the consent
search may be the only tool that police have when probable cause is not
present, and even when probable cause is present, the consent search
may be to the benefit of the person granting consent.45 Further, it may be
more convenient for the police to conduct a consent search if the suspect
is willing to give up her constitutional protections.46 However, when the
police have probable cause, some members of the Court have stated that
the Constitution prefers the input of a detached and neutral magistrate.47
In these cases, the methods the courts use to analyze consent become

surveillance.”); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (stating that for Fourth
Amendment purposes a man’s home is his castle); State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 931 (Wash.
1998) (“In no area is a citizen more entitled to his privacy than in his or her home.”
(quoting State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 599 (Wash. 1994) (citation omitted))); Hadl v. State,
47 S.W.3d 897, 902 (Ark. App. 2001) (“individuals have a high expectation of privacy in
their homes”). Indeed, when the search is of the home, and occurs at night, it can be
particularly problematic. See Leonetti, supra note 4, at note 60 (citing cases that note the
consistent recognition of nighttime searches of one’s home as “uniquely intrusive” and
people being awakened at night by police as “uniquely vulnerable to coercion”). For this
reason, the Federal Government, and many states, require more than probable cause to
justify serving a search warrant on a dwelling at nighttime. Id. (citing Gooding v. United
States, 416 U.S. 430, 437 (1974), for the proposition that the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure require positive certainty that the property is on the person or in the place to be
searched before a nighttime search will be authorized, with the exception of a search for
controlled substances).
45
The Court’s attitude toward consent searches was explained by Justice Stewart in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
In situations where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but
lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid
consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable
evidence. . . . And in those cases where there is probable cause to arrest
or search, but where the police lack a warrant, a consent search may
still be valuable. If the search is conducted and proves fruitless, that in
itself may convince the police that an arrest with its possible stigma
and embarrassment is unnecessary, or that a far more extensive search
pursuant to a warrant is not justified. In short, a search pursuant to
consent . . . is a constitutionally permissible and wholly legitimate
aspect of effective police activity.
Id. at 227-28.
46
DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.02, at 278. Dressler, however, also delivers a cautionary
rhetorical question regarding this justification: is police convenience, or police efficiency,
really important enough that we are willing to cast aside constitutional protections to
afford it? Id.
47
See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 180-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The intervention of a judicial
officer gives the Amendment vitality by restraining unnecessary and unjustified searches
and invasions of privacy before they occur.”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)
(“[T]he Constitution requires ‘that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial
officer . . . be interposed between the citizen and the police . . . .’” (quoting Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S 471, 481 (1963))).
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very important.48 Traditionally, the Court has used two options: either
the consent represents waiver of a constitutional right or the consent
search is a reasonable search.
1.

Constitutional Waiver or Reasonable Search?

Early consent cases indicated that the Supreme Court justified
consent searches on waiver grounds.49 That is, there was no exception to
the Fourth Amendment, but rather, a consenting person gives up the
right to be free from unreasonable searches.50 In this way, a person is
really giving up the claim that her rights were violated when she
consents to a search.51
The Court soon moved away from justifying consent searches on
waiver grounds. The reasoning behind the waiver grounds soon
conflicted with the facts surrounding other, Court approved, consent
cases.52 For example, the waiver of a constitutional right involves the
“intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.”53 However,
the Court specifically stated in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, discussed in
detail below, that a consent search can be upheld even if the consenter

48
415 U.S. at 180-81. Much more bothersome are the cases where police do not have
consent. Id. When the police know they could not obtain a search warrant even if they
tried, they resort to “bargaining” for consent. See VAN DUIZEND, SUTTON & CARTER, supra
note 12, at 21. This seems to run afoul of the very purpose of the Fourth Amendment itself,
for “there is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the
criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all.” Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S.
321, 329 (1987).
49
See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.02, at 277. For a discussion of the Bustamonte Court’s
handling of the waiver issue, see infra note 75 and accompanying text.
50
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (reasoning that the right to be free of a
warrantless search “was a right, . . . which only the petitioner could waive by word or
deed . . . .”); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) (holding consent to be invalid if
it is “granted in submission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional
waiver of a constitutional right”).
51
See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.02, at 277.
52
Id. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text for a discussion on third party
consent.
53
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Johnson had been imprisoned for
possessing and passing counterfeit money. Id. at 460. He sought a writ of habeas corpus
to review his claim that he was denied the assistance of counsel at his trial, violating his
Sixth Amendment rights. Id. The District Court Judge denied the writ finding that the lack
of assistance of counsel did not make the trial void. Id. The Supreme Court remanded the
case for determination whether Johnson intelligently and intentionally waived his
constitutional right to counsel. Id. at 469. The Court further stated that if Johnson did not
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel the writ must be granted. Id.
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did not know that she could refuse the police’s request.54 This conflict is
further shown in both the cases of third-party consent and the “apparent
authority” cases.55 Each of these cases involves one party granting
consent to the police to search the property of someone else, and absent
some agency relationship, person A cannot waive the constitutional
rights of person B.56
Illinois v. Rodriguez states the current justification for consent
searches.57 In Rodriguez, the Court explained that the consent obtained
by police made the search reasonable, and therefore no violation of the
Fourth Amendment occurred.58 As a result, consent is not really a
54
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). The Court reasoned that consent
searches are a part of standard investigatory techniques, and there was no reason to require
police to tell the resident they have the right to refuse the request to search. Id. at 231-32.
Knowledge of that right by the resident is one of the conditions to be evaluated as a part of
the “totality of all the circumstances.” Id. at 227; see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33
(1996) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not require that a lawfully seized person
be advised that she is free to go before her consent to a car search will be recognized as
voluntary, and following the Bustamonte approach in refusing to establish bright line rule).
This line of reasoning has been followed in the state courts as well. See State v. Woolfolk, 3
S.W.3d 823 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (ruling state constitution did not require a pre-consent
warning); State v. Forrester, 541 S.E.2d 837 (S.C. 2001) (holding that the state constitution
did not require police to issue a warning before the suspect granted consent).
55
See Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of
Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593 (1987); Peter Goldberger, Consent, Expectations of Privacy,
and the Meaning of “Searches” in the Fourth Amendment, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 319
(1984).
56
See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (“It is important to bear in mind that it
was [Stoner’s] constitutional right which was at stake here . . . . It was a right, therefore,
which only [Stoner] could waive by word or deed, either directly or through an agent.”).
57
497 U.S. 177 (1990). Rodriguez was arrested for possession of illegal drugs after police
found cocaine on the coffee table. Id. at 180. The police had been summoned to Dorothy
Jackson’s house to investigate an assault claim by Gail Fischer, Ms. Jackson’s daughter and
Rodriguez’s girlfriend. Id. at 179. Ms. Fischer claimed Rodriguez assaulted her at their
apartment and that he was at the apartment sleeping. Id. at 180. She agreed to take the
police there and let them in to arrest him. Id. She repeatedly referred to the apartment as
“our” apartment, and stated that she lived there with Rodriguez and had furniture and
clothes at the apartment. Id. Upon arriving at the apartment, Ms. Fischer unlocked the
door and let the police officers enter. Id. The officers then found the cocaine. Id.
Subsequently, it was determined that Ms. Fischer did not appear on the lease and did not
pay rent for the apartment. Id. The Court ruled that while Ms. Fischer had no actual
authority to consent to the search, it could have been reasonable, under the circumstances,
for the police to assume Ms. Fischer’s authority, and therefore the search itself was
reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 189. The case was remanded
for consideration of the reasonableness of the police’s presumptions. Id. The Court stated
that the important question was not whether a Fourth Amendment right had been waived,
but rather, had the right to be free from unreasonable searches been violated. Id. at 187.
58
Id. at 183-84. Some members of the Court in Rodriguez wanted to justify consent
searches with the logic that once a person has consented to a search, she has given up all
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warrant exception; if a search is reasonable, it comports with the Fourth
Amendment by definition.59
2.

Police Deception

Another consideration in consent searches is the use of deception to
gain consent.60 In Bumper v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that
a consent search cannot be upheld if the police claim that they already
have a warrant when, in fact, they do not.61 During the trial the
prosecutor reported to the judge that there was no warrant, but that
consent was given to search the home.62 The Court held that the search
was impermissible, reasoning that mere acquiescence to a claim of

expectations of privacy in the property in question. See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.02[B],
at 277. Under this view, a consent search is really not a search at all. Id. The dissent
claimed, “a person may voluntarily limit his expectation of privacy by allowing others to
exercise authority over his possessions.” Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 190 (Marshall, J., with
whom Brennan and Stevens, JJ., joined, dissenting). Justice Scalia refuted this statement
however, by saying: “To describe a consented search as a noninvasion of privacy and thus
a non-search is strange in the extreme.” Id. at 186 n.*.
59
DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.02, at 278; see also Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 189. For a further
discussion on consent searches, see LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 8. In addition, not only is a
consent search a “reasonable search,” police only need “reasonable” belief that consent has
been given. See United States v. Mendoza-Cepeda, 250 F.3d 626, 629 (8th Cir. 2001)
(upholding district court’s conclusion that “the Fourth Amendment ‘requires only that the
police reasonably believe the search to be consensual’”); People v. Henderson, 210 N.E.2d
483 (Ill. 1965) (reasoning that officers, as reasonable men, could conclude that defendant’s
consent was given). However, there are police actions that typically lead courts to a
finding of involuntariness—threats to a suspect or his family, deprivation of necessities
until suspect consents, asserting an absolute right to search, and an unusual or extreme
show of force. Strauss, supra note 3, at 225; see, e.g., United States v. Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 402
(6th Cir. 1998) (stating that the police threat to remove suspect’s child from the home
amounted to coercion); United States v. Tibbs, 49 F. Supp. 2d 47, 48-49 (D. Mass. 1999)
(ruling that the removal of suspect’s children was a force rendering suspect’s consent
coerced).
60
See LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 8.2, at 55; see also Ivy, 165 F.3d at 402 (ruling that the threat
to arrest suspect’s girlfriend and remove suspect’s children created coercive environment);
Tibbs, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 53 (holding that when police threatened to take away the suspect’s
children they coerced the consent given).
61
391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). Bumper, an African-American man, was charged with raping
a white woman. Id. at 544. Rape was a capital offense in North Carolina at that time. Id.
During the search of the home Bumper shared with his grandmother, a .22 caliber rifle was
found that allegedly was used in the rape. Id. Bumper was found guilty and sentenced to
death. Id.
62
Id. The State attempted to argue that the search was justified based on the fact that it
turned up the rifle allegedly used. Id. at 548. The Court ruled that this issue had been
settled long ago; a search that violates the constitution is not cured by what it brings to
light. Id.
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authority does not represent consent.63 Further, when an officer claims
to have authority to search a home under a warrant, he is in effect
making a claim that the occupant has no right to refuse the search.64 This
represents coercion on the part of the police, and “where there is
coercion, there cannot be consent.”65 Additionally, the Court stated that
consent must be given freely and voluntarily, and placed the burden of
proving free and voluntary consent on the State.66
3.

Voluntariness of Consent

Yet another consideration courts must give to consent searches is the
voluntariness of the consent granted.67 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte is the
seminal case in determining whether the consent was granted
voluntarily.68 In Bustamonte, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
63
Id. Bumper lived with his grandmother in a house at the end of an isolated dirt road.
Id. at 546. A sheriff, two deputies, and a state investigator went to his house in an attempt
to search for evidence. Id. When the police arrived, they informed Hattie Leath, Bumper’s
grandmother, that they had a search warrant, and asked to search the home. Id. She
replied “Go ahead.” Id. Mrs. Leath testified that she believed the officer that they had a
warrant, and if the law had a warrant they could search the house. Id. at 547. The Court
stated that consent must be given freely and voluntarily, and that the State had the burden
of proving consent was indeed given freely and voluntarily. Id.
64
Id. at 550. The Court’s observance of the occupant’s right to refuse the search will
reappear in later cases. See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text for a refining of this
test in the Bostick and Drayton cases. See also SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 42, at 38-46
(describing how linguistically police requests can be, and often are, interpreted as
commands which the accused has no right to refuse).
65
Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550. In this case, the Court found that the consent given was
merely “acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority,” and this was not enough to meet the
burden imposed on the State to show the consent was given freely and voluntarily. Id. at
549.
66
Id. at 547. There is question as to whether that burden remains on the prosecution, or
whether the judiciary has inadvertently shifted that burden to the accused via over-reliance
on police testimony. See infra notes 95-102.
67
See LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 8.2, at 51. LaFave argues that the voluntariness test is not
useful. Id. He argues that one reason the Miranda decision was made was in response to
the ineffectiveness of the voluntariness test in the coerced confession arena. Id. Actual
experience evidence often is allowed in at trial. Id. Also, courts tend to side with law
enforcement on questions of voluntariness. Id.; see also infra note 83 and accompanying
text.
68
412 U.S. 218 (1973). Bustamonte was a passenger in a vehicle that had been stopped
for having a headlight out. Id. at 220. He was sitting on the passenger side of the front seat
with another man, Alcala. Id. The driver could not provide the police officer with
identification, and Alcala told the officer the car belonged to his brother. Id. When the
police officer asked Alcala if he could search the car Alcala responded, “Sure, go ahead.”
Id. No person was threatened with arrest. Id. The officer found three checks that had been
stolen from a local car wash under the front seat of the vehicle. Id. Bustamonte was then
charged with possessing a check with intent to defraud. Id. at 218. At the trial court,
Bustamonte’s motion to suppress the checks was denied and he was convicted. Id. at 220.
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Circuit’s finding that consent was a waiver of a constitutional right and
that the consent granted must be freely and voluntarily given.69
Engaging in a review of coerced confession cases to establish the
meaning of voluntariness, the Court noted that the voluntariness of
confessions was measured by the confessor’s will being overborne,
which was indicated by a totality of the circumstances.70 Likewise, then,
consent to search should be a question of fact to be determined by the
“totality of all the circumstances.”71 Therefore, a person’s awareness, or
lack of awareness, of her constitutional rights becomes only a factor to be
considered as a part of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
consent given.72 However, in every case involving a consent search, the
He then sought a habeas corpus review in federal district court, and this was denied. Id. at
221.
69
Id. The Court cited Bumper. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the issues surrounding the Bumper case.
70
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 223, 226. The most extensive exposition of the meaning of
voluntariness has been in cases of confession. The Court stated that the need for police
questioning as a tool for effective enforcement of criminal laws is at one end of a spectrum
with the belief that unfair and brutal police tactics pose a real and serious threat to civilized
notions of justice at the other. Id. at 225. The Court also noted that “the Constitution
requires the sacrifice of neither security nor liberty.” Id. This test for confessions was
obviously supplemented by the Miranda case and its progeny. See infra Part II.C for a
discussion of the development of confession jurisprudence.
71
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227. Many commentators have criticized this holding by the
Court. DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.03, at 282; see also Strauss, supra note 3, at 872. These
critics contend, as did Justice Marshall in dissent, that the Court misstated the issue.
DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.03, at 282-83. Their contention is that the issue in Bustamonte
was whether the accused had waived his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches. Id. § 17.03, at 283. Justice Stewart discounted the contention by saying that the
waiver approach is inconsistent with the Court’s holding in third party consent cases.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 245. Those cases hold that any person who possesses common
authority over premises may consent to a search of the property. See DRESSLER, supra note
5, § 17.03, at 283. The Bustamonte Court stated however that “it is inconceivable that the
Constitution could countenance the waiver of a defendant’s [constitutional] right . . . by a
third party.” Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 245.
72
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226. This decision has been criticized for leading to confusion
at best and inadequate Fourth Amendment protections at worst. See Strauss, supra note 3,
at 235. The decision has been poorly understood and courts often ignore the factors
emphasized in Bustamonte. Id. It has been posited that people will inevitably feel coerced
simply by dealing with the police because of their authoritativeness. Id. Studies have
shown that people are significantly more apt to comply with orders they perceive coming
from an authority figure. Id. at 238. A person wearing a guard’s uniforms achieved 82%
compliance for simple commands such as, move away from a specified area or pick up that
piece of trash, while a “milkman” achieved 64% compliance, and a civilian achieved 36%.
Id. Indeed, some testimony in criminal trials indicates that defendants do not feel they can
refuse a police request. Melton v. State, 705 N.E.2d 564, 567 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
Additionally, judges have begun to recognize that citizens might view the request to search
as a demand if it comes from an authority figure. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 289 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 68 (N.J. 1975).
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prosecution has the burden of demonstrating that the consent, in fact,
was freely and voluntarily given.73
The Court reviewed factors generally considered in the totality of all
the circumstances surrounding confession cases.74 Among the factors
noted were the age of the accused, intelligence and education level of the
accused, lack of advisement as to constitutional rights, length of
detention, use of physical force, repeated and prolonged nature of the
questioning, and location of the questioning.75 In fact, the majority
indicated that no single factor would be outcome-determinative, but
taken together, these factors would be indicative of the totality of all the
circumstances surrounding the consent.76
The Court also noted that generally the person giving consent would
be in the home when granting consent and that the familiar
surroundings would also play a role in the totality.77 Indeed, the Court
distinguished Miranda based on this point, stating that Miranda ruled
that the stationhouse interview is inherently coercive, while the familiar
surroundings of the home prevented the consent scenario from being
inherently coercive.78 However, the Court failed to discuss any

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 222. The Court stated this was a question of fact to be
determined by looking at the totality of circumstances. Id. at 227.
74
Id. at 226. See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text for a review of the Court’s
treatment of these factors after Bustamonte.
75
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226. Again, the factors were settled upon by the Court after the
review of coerced confession cases with the Court noting these particular factors most often
were relied upon. Id.
76
Id. “The significant fact about all of these decisions is that none of them turned on the
presence or absence of a single controlling criterion; each reflected a careful scrutiny of all
the surrounding circumstances.” Id.
77
Id. at 247. However, this contradicts previous statements describing the sanctity of the
home being protected by the Fourth Amendment. Justice Frankfurter summarized the
view of the sanctity of the home when he stated:
The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a
free society. . . . The knock at the door, whether by day or by night, as a
prelude to a search, without authority of law but solely on the
authority of the police, did not need the commentary of recent history
to be condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights
enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of
English-speaking peoples.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1948); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
78
Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-28. Interestingly, the Court did not discuss other cases referencing
the reverence with which the home is treated. See supra note 14. The Court has also
invoked the issue of privacy in the home in other contexts as well. Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474 (1988). Justice O’Connor’s opinion described the targets of picketing as being
73
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Congressional or regulatory determinations on this point. For example,
the Court never mentioned a Federal Trade Commission regulation that
specifically deals with coercive sales tactics inside the home.79

literally and figuratively trapped inside their homes. Id. at 487. She went on to say that
even one picketer could “invade residential privacy.”
79
See 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (2005). The pertinent text reads as follows:
In connection with any door-to-door sale, it constitutes an unfair and
deceptive act or practice for any seller to:
(a) Fail to furnish the buyer with a fully completed receipt or copy
of any contract pertaining to such sale at the time of its execution,
which is in the same language, e.g., Spanish, as that principally
used in the oral sales presentation and which shows the date of
the transaction and contains the name and address of the seller,
and in immediate proximity to the space reserved in the contract
for the signature of the buyer or on the front page of the receipt if
a contract is not used and in bold face type of a minimum size of
10 points, a statement in substantially the following form:
“You, the buyer, may cancel this transaction at any
time prior to midnight of the third business day
after the date of this transaction. See the
attachednotice of cancellation form for an
explanation of this right.”
The seller may select the method of providing the buyer with the
duplicate notice of cancellation form set forth in paragraph (b) of this
section, provided however, that in the event of cancellation the buyer
must be able to retain a complete copy of the contract or receipt.
Furthermore, if both forms are not attached to the contract or receipt,
the seller is required to alter the last sentence in the statement above to
conform to the actual location of the forms.
(b) Fail to furnish each buyer, at the time the buyer signs the
door-to-door sales contract or otherwise agrees to buy consumer
goods or services from the seller, a completed form in duplicate,
captioned either “NOTICE OF RIGHT TO CANCEL” or
“NOTICE OF CANCELLATION,” which shall (where applicable)
contain in ten point bold face type the following information and
statements in the same language, e.g., Spanish, as that used in the
contract.
Id.
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Voluntariness after Bustamonte

The Court expanded Bustamonte in Florida v. Bostick.80 The Florida
Supreme Court held that the police coerced consents to search luggage
by conducting bus sweeps for drugs, therefore violating the Fourth
Amendment.81 But the Supreme Court reversed and stated that no per se
violation of the Fourth Amendment had occurred.82 The Court declared
that the appropriate test is whether the bus passenger would feel free to
decline the officers’ requests given the totality of all the circumstances.83
Since Bostick, the Court has stuck with the “free to end the
encounter” test, as demonstrated in United States v. Drayton.84 In
80
501 U.S. 429 (1991). In Bostick, a bus en route from Miami to Atlanta had a stopover in
Ft. Lauderdale. Id. at 431. While the bus was stopped, two officers with badges, insignia,
and one holding a zipper pouch containing a pistol, boarded the bus in an attempt to curb
the illegal transportation of drugs. Id. The two officers admitted to picking out Bostick for
no articulable reason. Id. The officers asked Bostick for his identification and ticket, and
immediately returned them after determining they were appropriate. Id. The officers
continued the interrogation, identifying themselves as drug officers and requested
permission to search Bostick’s belongings. Id. at 432. It was the point of contention
whether this consent took place, and whether this action by the police amounted to a
seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id.
81
Id. at 433. The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that Bostick would have been seized
for Fourth Amendment purposes due to the fact a reasonable person would not have felt
free to leave the bus to avoid the questioning. State v. Bostick, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla.
1989) (stating an impermissible seizure results when police engage in drug searches during
scheduled stops by questioning passengers without an articulable reason for doing so for
the purpose of gaining consent to search the luggage).
82
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 440. The Court was persuaded by several factors. Id. at 434-40.
First, the Court noted that police merely asking questions does not constitute a seizure. Id.
at 434. Second, the Court reasoned that if this encounter had taken place after the bus had
arrived in Atlanta or before it left Miami, there would be no doubt about the legitimacy of
the encounter. Id. Third, the Court stated the fact that Bostick would not have felt free to
leave the bus was due to his own decision to take the bus, an independent factor from any
coercive police behavior. Id. at 436. As a result of these factors, as well as the trial court’s
finding that the police had instructed Bostick that he had the right to refuse the search, the
Court overruled the Florida Supreme Court. Id. at 440. However, the Court intentionally
did not rule whether a seizure had taken place or not. Id. at 437.
83
Id. (stating that the case is remanded so that the Florida courts may evaluate the
seizure question under the correct legal standard).
84
536 U.S. 194 (2002). In Drayton, a bus was en route from Ft. Lauderdale to Detroit
when it made a scheduled stop for gas in Tallahassee. Id. at 197. At that time, three police
officers boarded the bus as part of drug interdiction program. Id. One officer observed
from the driver’s seat, one officer stayed at the rear of the bus, and one officer went up the
aisle and randomly asked passengers if he could search their bags and/or person. Id. at
198. When the officer got to Drayton and his traveling partner, they both indicated that the
officer could search their bags in the overhead bin. Id. After that search, they each
consented to the officer patting down their persons, where the officer found bags of cocaine
taped to their thighs. Id. at 199. The Court of Appeals ruled the search and seizure
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Drayton, another bus search case, the Court stated that when a
reasonable person would feel free to end the encounter, no seizure has
taken place, and that the consent is given voluntarily.85 The majority
paid particular attention to the actions of the police, and never discussed
the Bustamonte factors surrounding the person granting consent.86 In
fact, the Court seemed to say that police conduct is more decisive in the
voluntariness question than subjective factors surrounding the person
granting consent.87
However, a general problem that occurs with consent searches, and
is especially pertinent when considering the “knock and talk,” is that the
litigation of consent brings the integrity of judicial reviewer into the
equation.88 Often, the suspect’s version of events will differ dramatically
from the police officer’s version.89 In these instances, judges tend to side
with the police; they are uncomfortable accusing the police of lying
unless the evidence against the officer is overwhelming.90 This deference
occurs despite the fact that the need to convict, and the need to avoid
reprimand, creates incentives for the officer to misrepresent the
circumstances surrounding consent.91
These incentives manifest
themselves in two potential ways, with the first being outright perjury
unconstitutional, saying passengers on a bus would not feel free to disregard the search
request. Id. However, the Court reversed and remanded the decision. Id.
85
Id. at 203-04. Further, the Court stated that this test presupposes an innocent
reasonable person. Id. at 202. This is also affirmation of the Bostick decision utilizing the
reasonable innocent person. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437-38.
86
See Simmons, supra note 13, at 779 (stating that in practice the Court will only look at
police conduct in determining voluntariness); see also Strauss, supra note 3, at 222 (positing
that the subjectivity requirement of Bustamonte is dead).
87
A nuanced reading of Bustamonte also supports this contention. See Simmons, supra
note 13, at 779. The Court attempted to make clear that the purpose of the voluntariness
requirement is to prevent police misconduct, not to ensure the defendant is making a
subjectively free choice. Id. Further, it could be argued that the subjectively free choice is
irrelevant because the lynchpin of traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is
reasonableness, or, in other words, an objective inquiry into the appropriateness of police
action. Id. at 774.
88
See Strauss, supra note 3, at 244; see also Simmons, supra note 13, at 775 (“[T]he nearly
unanimous condemnation of the Court’s rulings on consensual searches is creating a
problem of legitimacy which threatens to undermine the integrity of judicial review of
police behavior.”).
89
Strauss, supra note 3, at 245 (calling these differences “conflicting tales”). Indeed, the
author cites as an example “several” students in her Criminal Procedure class report they
refused consent only to have the officer say “thank you for agreeing,” and then proceed to
search. Id. at 246 n.130.
90
See David S. Kaplan & Lisa Dixon, Coerced Waiver and Coerced Consent, 74 DENV. U. L.
REV. 941, 947 (1997). Further, many recognize the accused’s incentive to lie to maintain his
freedom. Id.
91
See Strauss, supra note 3, at 245.
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by the officer.92 Some believe that judges knowingly accept this perjury
and purposefully ignore the law to keep evidence from being
suppressed.93 The second manifestation is selective perception, or
“misremembering.”94 Either one of these manifestations impacts the
integrity of the judicial system and the public’s belief in its ability to
render fair and objective justice.95
C. Confessions: Can Police “Bargain” for Confessions?
Because consent search law, as developed by Bustamonte, relied so
heavily on coerced confession jurisprudence, a review of confession case
Id. at 245-49; see also Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 82-83 (1992)
(reporting a study of prosecuting attorneys, judges, and police officers revealed “pervasive
police perjury intended to avoid the requirements of the Fourth Amendment”). One
former Police Chief admitted his belief that perjury (called “testilying”) is common at
suppression hearings with respect to consent searches. Strauss, supra note 3, at 246
(referring to Morgan Cloud, Judges, “Testilying,” and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341,
1356-57 (1996)); Joseph McNamara, Has the Drug War Created an Officer’s Liars Club?, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1996, at M1.
[H]undreds of thousands of police officers swear under oath . . . that
the defendant gave consent to a search. This may happen occasionally
but it defies belief that so many drug users are . . . so dumb as to give
cops consent to search . . . when they possess drugs.
McNamara, supra, at M1; see also Maurice Possley & Gary Marx, Drug Busts Only as Good as
Cop’s Word, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 4, 1997, § 1, at 1 (describing study by a member of the
Minnesota House of Representatives interviewing judges, prosecutors, police officers,
public defenders working in the Cook County Criminal Courts and found 64% of judges
and 84% of public defenders interviewed believed officers shade the facts as much as
needed to obtain probable cause when there may not have been probable cause); United
States v. Heath, 58 F.3d 1271, 1276 (8th Cir. 1995) (McMillian, J., concurring) (“The police
officers’ saccharine account of the events . . . leaves a bitter aftertaste . . . . The ‘fact’ that
[defendant] would so willingly consent to the search of . . . the shoe box, which he knew
contained drugs . . . is surprising, to say the least.”).
93
See Orfield, supra note 92, at 83. The reasons for these actions by judges are that the
judge may feel that it is unjust to suppress the evidence under the circumstances of the
case, fear of adverse publicity, or worry that a suppression will hurt the chance for reelection. Id. Orfield also noted that serious cases in Chicago are diverted to judges who
have the reputation of being more likely to convict the defendant. Id.
94
See Strauss, supra note 3, at 250. Selective perception occurs when the suspect grants
conditional consent, but the officer hears an unqualified yes. Id. at 249. As time goes by,
the words used by the suspect become even more convincingly clear in the officer’s head;
so much so that, by the time of trial, the officer can honestly take the stand and testify that
the suspect clearly and without qualification consented. Id.
95
Id. at 252. This is analogous to the testimony regarding the question of whether the
suspect received and understood his Miranda rights. See infra note 128. However, there are
reasons to believe testimony in the Miranda realm is more reliable—first, the rights are
often given and received in the more formal setting of the stationhouse, and, second, those
interrogations are often videotaped. Id.
92
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law is necessary as it also impacts the “knock and talk” analysis. A
privilege against compelled self-incrimination in United States
jurisprudence has existed since the Supreme Court’s decision in Bram v.
United States.96 This decision held that the Fifth Amendment privilege
was applicable to federal criminal trials as a matter of constitutional
law.97 However, because the Court did not find that this right was
fundamental, it was not applicable to state criminal trials.98
Because the Fifth Amendment was not available to keep coerced
confessions out of state criminal trials, the Court often resorted to the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.99 This clause was the
instrument of choice for the Supreme Court until Malloy v. Hogan.100 In
Hogan, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment was now applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, thus ensuring that
suspects in state criminal trials could assert the Fifth Amendment
privilege as a basis for excluding a coerced confession.101
During the period that Hogan was decided, the Court became
concerned with the interrogation techniques used by law enforcement
officials.102 The use of the Due Process Clause caused police to move
from physical force during interrogations to psychological pressures to
elicit confessions.103 The Court wanted to even the playing field in the
interrogation room, believing that the police had an unfair advantage
over suspects.104 This belief, in part, led the Court in Escobedo v. Illinois to
96
168 U.S. 532 (1897) (holding that a confession can never be received into evidence
when it has been brought about by threats or violence).
97
Id. at 542. The pertinent text of the Fifth Amendment: “No person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
98
See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 23.01[B][1], at 436.
99
Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Coerced Confessions and the Fourth Amendment, 30
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 57 (2002). The pertinent text of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
100
378 U.S. 1 (1964). Malloy was arrested during a gambling raid. Id. at 3. The Court
held that the constitutional inquiry is not whether the conduct of state officers in obtaining
the confession was shocking, but rather was the confession “free and voluntary.” Id. at 7.
101
Id. at 3.
102
See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 24.02, at 457. A majority of the Supreme Court viewed
confessions “darkly as the product of police coercion.” Id. (quoting Gerald M. Caplan,
Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1425 (1985)).
103
Id.
104
Id. Coerced confession jurisprudence developed in response to the use of physical
and psychological coercion to extract statements from criminal suspects. See Caplan, supra
note 102, at 1425. The first case in this line of jurisprudence was Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278 (1936). In Brown, three African-American suspects were indicted for murder based
on confessions obtained by torturing the suspects until they agreed to confess. Id. at 281.
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declare that the Sixth Amendment extended the right to counsel to the
interrogation room.105
To combat the confusion that Escobedo created, the Court chose four
appeals cases, now treated collectively as Miranda, to announce a
clarification of suspects’ rights in the interrogation room.106 In Miranda,
the Court announced a prophylactic rule establishing a conclusive
presumption that coercion was present if certain warnings were not
given or a waiver of these rights was not obtained.107 The Court viewed
the Miranda warnings as a solution to the problem caused by various
tests being used to determine the “voluntariness” of a suspect’s
confession.108
However, the mere issuance of Miranda warnings does not end the
coercion analysis.109 A court must still go through the coercion analysis
even if Miranda is followed.110 That being said, coercive police conduct is
now required if a post warning confession is to be found involuntary.111
105
378 U.S. 478 (1964). In Escobedo, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is violated when a suspect is the focus of an investigation and has requested and is
denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer. Id. at 490-91. Escobedo had been held
during a murder investigation and was not allowed to confer with his hired counsel while
police were questioning him. Id. at 481. The police told Escobedo’s attorney he could not
see Escobedo until they were done with the investigation. Id. The interrogation lasted
overnight, and eventually Escobedo made incriminating statements to the police before he
was allowed to confer with his attorney. Id. at 482. The Court ruled that when Escobedo
requested the presence of his attorney, the interrogation ceased to be a general inquiry, that
Escobedo had become the accused, and the purpose of the interrogation was to get him to
confess his guilt despite the constitutional right not to do so. Id. at 485. The Court declared
the statement inadmissible and overturned the conviction. Id. at 484.
106
See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 24.04, at 460.
107
See Mannheimer, supra note 99, at 62. In this setting, the term “prophylactic rule”
refers to a rule devised by the Court for the purpose of preventing a violation of a
constitutional right. DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 4.05, at 73-74. In this context, the rule means
that the Miranda warnings must be given to ensure any confession a suspect makes is not
coerced by law enforcement. Id.
108
See Mannheimer, supra note 99, at 70. The test for coercion had been whether the
suspect’s will was overborne or whether the confession was the product of a rational
intellect and a free will. Id. The standard became whether the confession was voluntary
under all the circumstances, taking into account the police conduct and the character of the
confessor. Id.
109
Id. at 72.
110
Id. This provides a prohibition of coercive police tactics even where Miranda has been
given. Id. In other words, just giving the Miranda warning does not give the police the
authority to physically or psychologically coerce a confession out of the suspect. Id. The
confession must be the result of the suspect’s free will. Id.
111
Id. at 75; see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-64, 167 (1986) (“[T]he crucial
element of police [is] overreaching . . . . Absent police conduct causally related to the
confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a
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Given these facts, confusion about the applicability of the Miranda
warnings was rampant.112
Questions arose regarding the
constitutionality of the warnings and if a Miranda violation represented a
constitutional violation.113 Further, if a violation of Miranda was a
constitutional violation, many wondered if a “fruits” analysis was
needed for subsequent statements or evidence obtained as a result of the
unwarned statement.114
The Court attempted to answer these questions in later cases,
although scholars are somewhat skeptical of the logic utilized by the
holdings.115 First, the Court addressed the constitutional issue in
Michigan v. Tucker,116 stating that the violation of Miranda rules was a
violation only of prophylactic rules developed to protect the Fifth
Amendment right.117

criminal defendant of due process of law.”). However, the prosecution bears the burden of
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a waiver exists and that it was
voluntarily obtained. Id. at 169.
112
See Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda?, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 449
(2002). For example, Clymer argues that police decisions not to use Miranda warnings are
not, in and of themselves, constitutional violations. Id. at 450. Rather, the police only
violate Miranda if statements are used in court that otherwise should have been
inadmissible. Id. Clymer posits that Miranda warnings only affect the admissibility of a
suspect’s statement. Id.
113
Compare id. at 449-50 (“Miranda is best understood as a constitutional rule of
admissibility.”), with supra note 99 and accompanying text.
114
The “fruits” analysis comes from a Fourth Amendment case. Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); see supra note 6 and accompanying text (explaining “fruit of
the poisonous tree”). In Wong Sun, evidence otherwise admissible but obtained as a result
of an earlier Fourth Amendment violation, the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” is excluded as
tainted to keep from encouraging future violations. 371 U.S. at 484.
115
Peter Bowman Rutledge & Nicole L. Angarella, An End of Term Exam: October Term
2003 at the Supreme Court of the United States, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 151, 179 (2004)
(characterizing these decisions as “splintered”); see also The Supreme Court: 2003 Term
Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REV. 306, 311 (2004) (describing decisions as “doctrinally
incoherent” and “compromise” decisions).
116
417 U.S. 433 (1974). In Tucker, the suspect in a rape investigation was not given his
complete Miranda warnings. Id. at 435. During the interrogation the suspect gave a
statement mentioning the name of someone else who might have been involved in the
crime. Id. The prosecution in Tucker used this person as a witness against the suspect, and
the issue involved in the case was whether the fruit—the name of the witness divulged in a
Miranda-less interview—was admissible. Id. at 436-38.
117
Id. at 444. Justice Rehnquist stated:
A comparison of the facts in this case with the historical circumstances
underlying the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
strongly indicates that the police conduct here did not deprive
respondent of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination as
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But the Tucker decision did little to abate the confusion in the legal
community.118 For instance, if Miranda was not a constitutional rule,
then the power of the Court to enforce the rule in state proceedings was
questionable.119 The Court had the chance to clarify the constitutional
position of Miranda in two cases, Oregon v. Elstad120 and Dickerson v.
United States.121 In Elstad, the Court held that a second Mirandized
statement could be admitted into evidence under certain circumstances
and was not to be excluded.122 The Court reasoned that if the police
make errors in administering a prophylactic Miranda procedure, it
should not be equated with a violation of the Fifth Amendment itself.123
As a result, this holding followed Tucker’s logic that the Miranda decision
such, but rather failed to make available to him the full measure of
procedural safeguards associated with that right since Miranda.
Id.
118
Id. at 475-76. This ruling seemed to say that a Miranda violation was not a
constitutional violation; therefore, there was no “poisonous tree,” or unconstitutional
action, from which to get fruit. See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 24.06, at 475.
119
DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 24.06, at 475 (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982)
for the proposition that the Supreme Court lacks general supervisory authority over state
judicial proceedings).
120
470 U.S. 298 (1985). In Elstad, the suspect was arrested in his parents’ home. Id. at 30001. While one of the officers was informing his mother of the circumstances of his arrest,
the other officer asked the suspect about a burglary next door. Id. The suspect responded
that he was there, and then confessed again during questioning at the station house. Id.
The Court ruled that the confession at the station house was voluntary, and came after a
Miranda warning. Id. at 315. Therefore, it was properly admitted into evidence. Id. at 318.
The Court discounted the psychological effects of the suspect’s prior confession, instead
focusing on the voluntariness of each confession, the time interval between them, and the
change in scenery and interrogators. Id. at 312-16. The Court characterized the failure to
issue a Miranda warning in the suspect’s house as an “oversight.” Id. at 316.
121
530 U.S. 428 (2000). In Dickerson, Dickerson was indicted for bank robbery, conspiracy
to commit bank robbery, and using a firearm to commit an act of violence, all violations of
Title 18 of the United States Code. Id. at 432. Before trial, Dickerson moved to exclude a
statement he had made to the local branch office of the FBI on grounds that he did not
receive his Miranda warnings prior to the interrogation. Id. The District Court agreed and
granted his motion. Id. However, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, while
agreeing that the Miranda warnings were not given, reversed the Disctrict Court. Id. The
Court of Appeals ruled that Miranda was not a constitutional decision and therefore
Congress could overrule the decision. Id. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that the
voluntariness provisions of § 3501 were met, and therefore, the statement by Dickerson
should be allowed. Id. Congress had responded to the Miranda decision by passing
legislation stating the voluntariness issue was determinative in the federal context when
evaluating confessions. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000). This piece of legislation was declared
unconstitutional in this decision. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 439.
122
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 312 (“When neither the initial nor the subsequent admission is
coerced, little justification exists for permitting the highly probative evidence of a voluntary
confession to be irretrievably lost to the factfinder.”).
123
Id. at 306 (“The Miranda exclusionary rule, however, serves the Fifth Amendment and
sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.”).
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was not a constitutional rule.124 However, in direct contrast, Dickerson
held that Miranda was a “constitutional decision” and had a
“constitutional origin.”125 Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in the majority
opinion that “we conclude that Miranda announced a constitutional rule
that Congress may not supersede legislatively.”126 As a result, the states
were bound to enforce Miranda.127
The Dickerson ruling has been largely described as a decision
attempting to get to the middle ground of the interrogation debate.128
The holding has been widely criticized as illogical and Chief Justice
Rehnquist has been criticized as not adequately distinguishing either
Elstad or Tucker.129 Even so, it seems clear from these rulings that the
police do not violate the Constitution by merely refusing to give the
Miranda warnings or failing to get a waiver of those rights.130 Rather, the
Fifth Amendment is violated only when the coerced statements are used
Id. at 308 (noting that, as in Tucker, “the absence of any coercion or improper tactics
undercuts the twin rationales—trustworthiness and deterrence—for a broader rule”).
125
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 439 (concluding that Miranda presented constitutional guidelines
for law enforcement to follow, and the statements obtained from the suspect did not meet
constitutional standards).
126
Id. at 444.
127
Id. The legislation at issue in Dickerson was 18 U.S.C. § 3501, an attempt by Congress
to overrule Dickerson by reinstituting the voluntariness test in evaluating confessions. Id. at
435-46.
128
See generally Yale Kamisar, A Look Back on a Half-Century of Teaching, Writing and
Speaking About Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 69 (2004);
Rutledge & Angarella, supra note 115, at 179 (describing the Dickerson decision as a
“détente”).
129
See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 453 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that in light of the decisions
in Elstad and Tucker that it is simply no longer possible for the Court to conclude that a
violation of Miranda’s rules is also a constitutional violation); see also William S. Consovoy,
The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare Decisis: Casey, Dickerson and the
Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 53 (describing the Dickerson
decision as the end of stare decisis); Joelle Anne Moreno, Faith Based Miranda?: Why the
New Missouri v. Seibert Police “Bad Faith” Test Is a Terrible Idea, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 396-97
(2005) (calling the belief that “Dickerson’s constitutional imprimatur” on Miranda’s rules
would enhance law enforcement compliance “naive”); The Supreme Court, supra note 115, at
311 (describing the Dickerson opinion as “doctrinally incoherent but carefully crafted to
protect culturally entrenched Miranda warnings from congressional attack, all the while
purporting to preserve Elstad and the other fruits cases”).
130
See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003). In Chavez, a struggle broke out when
police attempted to interview suspect Martinez regarding narcotics activity. Id. at 763.
During the scuffle, the suspect took the gun out of one officer’s holster. Id. at 764. Upon
seeing this, the other officer shot Martinez several times and placed him under arrest. Id.
Officer Chavez, a patrol supervisor, proceeded to interview Martinez while he was getting
medical treatment at the hospital. Id. At no time were the Miranda warnings given to
Martinez. Id. The Court held that because no charges were ever filed against Martinez,
there was no Fifth Amendment violation. Id. at 772.
124
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against the accused during a trial.131 Police violation of the Miranda rules
will only affect the subsequent statement’s admissibility.132 It is equally
clear that a suspect’s issuance of an unwarned statement should not be a
complete bar to the admissibility of a subsequent statement that the
suspect might make during a future interrogation after the Miranda
warnings have been issued.133
D. The Seibert Decision
Taking the next logical step, the Court hoped to answer the question
of admissibility of statements in a “question-first” context, defined as
interrogating the suspect first and then issuing the Miranda warnings, in
the case of Missouri v. Seibert.134 In a plurality opinion, the Court
affirmed the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision, and held that both
the pre-warning and post-warning statements by the suspect should
have been excluded.135 Justice Souter, announcing the decision of the
Id. “All the Fifth Amendment forbids is the introduction of coerced statements at
trial.” Id. (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 686 (1984)); see also Clymer, supra
112, at 450 (noting that police decisions not to use Miranda are not a constitutional violation
and that the constitutional violation only occurs when the statement is used at trial).
132
See Clymer, supra note 112, at 450 (stating the only effect of a violation of Miranda is on
the statement’s admissibility).
133
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985).
It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure
to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or
other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect’s ability to
exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory process that a
subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some
indeterminate period.
Id.
134
124 S. Ct. 2601, 2607 (2004). Patrice Seibert’s 12 year-old son had cerebral palsy. Id. at
2605. When he died in his sleep, she feared that she would be charged with neglect
because of bedsores on his body. Id. Her two teenage sons and two of their friends
devised a plan to conceal the facts surrounding the boy’s death by incinerating his body
during the course of burning the family’s mobile home. Id. To avoid the appearance that
they had left the child unattended, they planned to leave Donald Rector, a mentally ill
teenager living with the family, in the mobile home while it burned. Id. This plan was
hatched in the presence of Patrice Seibert; her son, Darian, and a friend set fire to the home,
and Donald died. Id. at 2606. Five days later the police arrested Seibert. Id. “Question
first” refers to the police technique of interviewing the suspect, getting a confession, then
giving her the Miranda warning, and repeating the pre-warning questions. See infra note
144 for a description of the use of this technique in Seibert.
135
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2605. Officer Kevin Clinton followed instructions from Officer
Richard Hanrahan that he refrain from giving Miranda warnings. Id. Seibert was
transported to a police station and left in an interrogation room for 15-20 minutes before
Hanrahan questioned her without giving her Miranda warnings. Id. at 2606. During the
initial interview, Hanrahan questioned Seibert for 30 to 40 minutes and at one point was
squeezing her arm and repeating “Donald was also to die in his sleep.” Id. Seibert finally
131
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Court,136 first observed that the goals of Miranda and the question-first
technique conflict.137 The goal of Miranda is to ensure that interrogation
practices do not “overbear the will” of the accused and to ensure that the
accused is aware of the choices the Constitution guarantees.138 Questionfirst techniques, on the other hand, are intended to render the Miranda
warnings ineffective by issuing them right after a suspect has confessed
and may psychologically feel like she has already waived those rights.139
The Court concluded that the appropriate inquiry is whether the
warnings issued reasonably conveyed to the suspect the rights the
Constitution guarantees.140 In other words, given the circumstances of
the interrogation, the determining factor would be whether the warnings
acted as effectively as Miranda required.141

admitted she knew Donald was meant to die in the fire. Id. At this point she was given a
twenty-minute coffee and cigarette break. Id. After this break, Hanrahan gave Seibert the
Miranda warnings and turned on a tape recorder. Id. He then resumed the questioning and
frequently referred to her pre-warning statements. Id. The pertinent language used by
Officer Hanrahan was “Ok, ‘Trice, we’ve been talking for a little while about what
happened on Wednesday the twelfth, haven’t we?” Id. Also, “Trice, didn’t you tell me that
he [Donald] was supposed to die . . . ?” Id. During the post-Miranda interview Seibert
confessed again to knowing that Donald was supposed to die in the fire. Id. Seibert was
charged with first-degree murder for her role in Donald’s death. Id. At trial Seibert sought
to exclude both her pre-warning and post warning statements. Id. Officer Hanrahan
admitted that he made a “conscious decision” to withhold Miranda warnings stating that he
was using an interrogation technique he had been taught: question first, give the warnings,
and then repeat the question “until I get the answer that she’s already provided once.” Id.
136
Id. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined this opinion, with Justice Breyer
filing his own concurring opinion. Id. at 2613. Justice Kennedy filed his own concurring
opinion. Id. at 2614. Justice O’Connor dissented, and was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id. at 2616.
137
Id. at 2609 (“attention must be paid to the conflicting objects of Miranda and questionfirst”).
138
Id. These practices by police departments are hardly limited to Missouri. See Clymer,
supra note 112, at 451 (characterizing intentional violations of Miranda by police as
“advantageous,” “sensible,” and “constitutional”); see also Charles D. Weisselberg, In the
Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1123-25 (2001) (describing various
California police training instructions for questioning “outside Miranda”).
139
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2609. “The object of question-first is to render Miranda warnings
ineffective by waiting for a particularly opportune time to give them, after the suspect has
already confessed.” Id. at 2610.
140
Id. “The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably ‘conve[y] to [a suspect]
his rights as required by Miranda.’” Id. (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203
(1989)).
141
Id. “In a sequential confession case, clarity is served if the later confession is
approached by asking whether in the circumstances the Miranda warnings given could
reasonably be found effective.” Id. at 2610 n.4.
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Seibert argued that the warned confession should be kept out
because it was “fruit of the poisonous tree.”142 She claimed this evidence
was otherwise admissible but discovered as the result of an earlier
constitutional violation and should be excluded so that the law does not
encourage future violations.143 But the Court rejected this argument
based on the holding in Elstad.144 The Court took the position that clarity
is best served by approaching the second confession from the position
that if it was possible for the Miranda warnings to be effective, then the
voluntariness of the confession and waiver could be upheld.145 If not,
then the confession would be inadmissible for lack of adequate Miranda
warnings.146
The factors identified by the Seibert plurality distinguished the
interrogations involved in Seibert from the interrogation involved in
Elstad.147 In Elstad, the Court noted that the questioning at the station
house was a marked difference from the limited questioning that had
taken place at the suspect’s house.148 Not only was the setting markedly
different, but new interrogators were used as well.149 Also, the
statements made at the suspect’s house were never referred to by the

Id.
Id. Seibert based her argument on the Wong Sun Fourth Amendment context. Id. See
supra note 6 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wong Sun and “fruits of the
poisonous tree.”
144
Id. In Elstad, the Court held that any Miranda violation did not so taint the
proceedings that law enforcement could never gain a valid waiver of the rights. Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 300 (1985). Rather, the admissibility of any subsequent statement was
to turn solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made. Id.
145
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2610. The Court identified five factors it used to analyze the
question-first interrogation. Id. at 2612. These factors constitute the approach Justice
Breyer feels will act, in practice, as a “fruits” approach. Id. at 2613. First, the Court looked
at the completeness and detail of the questions and answers involved in the pre-warning
interrogation. Id. at 2612. Second, it was critical that the content of the pre-warning and
post-warning interrogations were similar. Id. Third, the Court noted the timing and
setting of the first and second confessions, and fourth the continuity of police personnel
involved in the interrogations. Id. Finally, the Court considered the degree to which the
interrogator’s questions treated the second round of questioning as continuous with the
first. Id.
146
Id.
147
Id. The plurality argues that a “reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes could have
seen the station house questioning as a new and distinct experience, the Miranda warnings
could have made sense as presenting a genuine choice whether to follow up on the earlier
admission.” Id.
148
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 315 (noting that the officers stopped in the living room to notify the
mother of the reasons for the arrest and not to interrogate her son).
149
Id. at 301. The settings were the suspect’s home and the stationhouse while the
interrogators were the arresting officer and a police detective. Id.
142
143
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interrogator at the station house.150 The Court found that these
differences would have enabled the suspect to make an informed choice
about his rights at the station house, rendering the Miranda warnings
effective in that situation.151
The Seibert case presented a far different scenario.152 The plurality
noted that the same interrogator was involved in both interrogations and
that they took place in the same room at the station house.153
Additionally, the interrogator also referred back to Seibert’s unwarned
statements repeatedly during the second interview.154 Further, while not
proscribing a set length of time between statements for Miranda to be
effective, the plurality stated that twenty minutes was not long
enough.155 These factors combined to vitiate the effectiveness of the
Miranda warnings before the second confession.156 Specifically, the
plurality stated that the second confession was a mere continuation of
the unwarned statement and as such was to be excluded.157

Id. at 301-02.
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2607, 2612.
152
Id. The Court referred to the Seibert scenario as “the opposite extreme.” Id.
153
Id. The Court was influenced by the fact that Officer Hanrahan “said nothing to
counter the probable misimpression that the advice that anything Seibert said could be
used against her also applied to the details” of the unwarned statement. Id. In other
words, the police never told her that her prior statement could not be used. Id.
154
Id. The Court noted that “any uncertainty on her part about a right to stop talking
about matters previously discussed would only have been aggravated by the way Officer
Hanrahan set the scene by saying ‘we’ve been talking for a little while about what
happened on Wednesday the twelfth, haven’t we?’” Id. at 2613.
155
Id. The length of time, comparatively, in Elstad was over one hour. Elstad, 470 U.S. at
301.
156
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613.
157
Id. Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, stated that he believed the analysis followed by
the plurality would act as a “fruits” based analysis, similar to the fruits analysis in other
Fourth Amendment cases. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). He felt this way despite the express
rejection of this type of analysis in Elstad, and the plurality in this case. Id. Justice Breyer
argued for a “fruits” analysis because prosecutors and judges understand how to apply the
approach. Id. He also believed that effective Miranda warnings would only occur when
certain circumstances, such as the plurality’s five factors, intervene to break the connection
between the two statements. Id. at 2614; see, e.g., Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982)
(holding that evidence obtained subsequent to a constitutional violation must be
suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree” unless “intervening events break the causal
connection”). He therefore believed that unless the failure to warn was a good faith failure,
the “fruits” of the unwarned statement should be excluded. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613
(Breyer, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor took issue with the “fruits” analysis and agreed
with the plurality’s refusal to apply it. Id. at 2617 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). She stated that
the analysis may involve the same facts and circumstances as a “fruits” analysis would
consider, but it does so for entirely different reasons. Id. The “fruits” analysis seeks to
balance the probative value of the evidence with the deterrence value of exclusion, while
150
151
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Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, supported by somewhat
different reasoning.158 He argued that the Court must first determine
whether the failure to warn was deliberate or unintentional,159 and stated
that the Elstad decision should continue to be applied unless the failure
to warn was deliberate.160 The second prong of Justice Kennedy’s
argument was that in intentional failure to warn cases, curative measures
should be allowed.161 The curative measures he would allow are very
similar to the factors that the plurality considered.162 In the alternative,
Justice Kennedy reasoned, a statement by the interrogator to the suspect
that the previous interview would most likely be inadmissible could also
serve as a curative measure and make the subsequent statement
admissible.163

the plurality uses those factors to determine the psychological affect they had on the
suspect. Id.
158
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurrence). His concurrence has been
criticized as being the “unfortunate byproduct” of the Court’s concern over law
enforcement’s deliberate withholding of Miranda. Moreno, supra note 129, at 396.
159
Moreno, supra note 129, at 396. However, this is clearly inconsistent with Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), which held that thoughts kept inside a police officer’s head
cannot affect the suspect’s experience. This would seem to dispel the need for a dichotomy
between intentional and unintentional violation of Miranda because the suspect would
have experienced the interrogation in the same manner. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2618
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). This test would also seem to shift an “impossible and
inappropriate” burden onto the defendant to prove an officer acted in bad faith. Moreno,
supra note 129, at 397-98.
160
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2616 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). See infra note 171 for Justice
O’Connor’s criticism of this contention.
161
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2616 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). In this matter Justice O’Connor
agreed with the plurality and disagreed with Justice Kennedy. Id. at 2618. She reasoned
that the Court had previously held that the thoughts occurring in the interviewer’s head
are irrelevant when it comes to the voluntariness of the suspect’s statement. See infra note
172 and accompanying text. In Burbine, the police were interrogating a suspect while an
attorney the suspect’s sister had hired for him (without his knowledge) was waiting in the
lobby. 475 U.S. at 417-18. The Court held, in an opinion by Justice O’Connor, that the
police’s failure to inform the suspect about the attorney his sister had hired did not deprive
him of his right to counsel or vitiate the waiver of Miranda rights. Id. at 422-23. The Court
reasoned that the police activity had “no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and
knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.” Id. at 422. Therefore, according to Justice
O’Connor dissent in Seibert, Officer Hanrahan’s intent could not impact Seibert’s capacity
to comprehend and knowingly relinquish her rights. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2618 (O’Connor,
J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice O’Connor noted that it would be frequently difficult, if
not impossible, to tell what states of mind different interviewers had, and the likelihood of
error would be high. Id.
162
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2618. Justice Kennedy’s curative measures are a substantial break
in time or a statement that the pre-warning statement is inadmissible. Id.
163
Id. Justice O’Connor noted that Justice Kennedy’s stated reason for concurring with
the plurality was that no curative measures were taken in this instance. Id.
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Justice O’Connor, in her dissent, would have kept to the “knowingly
and voluntarily made” test employed in Elstad.164 She reasoned that if
the first statement was shown to be involuntary, then a court must
examine whether the taint was dissipated through the passage of time or
change in scenery.165 The important issue for Justice O’Connor was the
voluntariness of the second confession.166
Consequently, Justice
O’Connor would have remanded the case for the Missouri courts to
consider the voluntariness of Seibert’s second confession.167
The next step is to analyze the “knock and talk” utilizing the legal
tests put forth by the Court. Specifically, Part III takes the judicial tests
set forth and applies them to the “knock and talk” context.
III. IS THE “KNOCK AND TALK” A TOLERABLE INVESTIGATORY TOOL?
Police engage in constitutional activity when they go to the door of a
residence and knock on it.168 This proposition has been stated in the
curtilage and open fields doctrines, pertaining to the area outside of a
home generally accessible to the public, and is not questioned in this
Note. The analysis must begin, therefore, at the point where the
constitutional activity begins to blur—that is, when the “knock and talk”
is used to evade the warrant requirement.169 The “knock and talk”
technique falls under the purview of consent searches. However, as
demonstrated above, the development of consent case law was based on
the development of coerced confession cases.170 Therefore, Part III.A will
analyze the “knock and talk” using the development of coerced
confession cases, principally Missouri v. Seibert, because this

164
“The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily
made.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985). Justice O’Connor opined that it is a rare
instance when a police officer is so forthcoming regarding his true intentions in
withholding the Miranda warnings. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2618 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). In
the future, she imagined, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to discern the true
intention of the officer. Id.
165
“When a prior statement is actually coerced, the time that passes between confessions,
the change in place of interrogations, and the change in identity of the interrogators all bear
on whether that coercion has carried over into the second confession.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at
310. These are also similar to Justice Kennedy’s curative measures. See supra note 161.
166
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2619 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
167
Id. at 2620.
168
The area outside of the home, open to the public, from the street to the front door is
covered under the curtilage and open field doctrines. See supra note 13 for an explanation
of these doctrines.
169
See supra note 4 (describing the “knock and talk” as being a method of avoiding the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment).
170
See supra notes 96-133 and accompanying text.
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development was examined in Bustamonte.171 Following that analysis,
Part III.B will analyze the “knock and talk” using the “totality of all the
circumstances” test from Bustamonte itself.172
Both analyses will
demonstrate the questionable constitutionality of the “knock and talk”
technique that will be addressed in Part IV of this Note.173
A. Coerced Confession Analysis
The application of coerced confession case analysis has its roots in
Supreme Court precedent.174 Coerced confession case history shows that
the Court is concerned with the psychological advantage that the police
have over suspects when engaged in interrogation.175 In fact, the Court
went so far as to say that coercion was a conclusive presumption if
Miranda warnings were not given.176 However, Bustamonte currently
governs this point in the search context because the Court explicitly
ruled that a warning is not required.177
On the other hand, these differing results seem illogical. The Fourth
Amendment is mostly concerned with intrusions into the home.178 If so,
searching a residence without a warrant and without properly obtained
consent would represent a constitutional violation invoking the “fruit of
the poisonous tree” doctrine.179 Conversely, the Court has already ruled
that a Miranda violation does not in and of itself represent a
constitutional violation, but can lead to the exclusion of the results of an
interrogation.180 It then becomes difficult to justify a consent search
See infra notes 174-225 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 226-51 and accompanying text.
173
See infra notes 252-66 and accompanying text.
174
See supra note 70 and accompanying text (reporting that the Bustamonte Court looked
to coerced confession cases for definitions of “voluntariness”). This comparison makes
sense on many different levels. See Simmons, supra note 13, at 795. In both contexts, the
police are asking the defendant to voluntarily take actions that go against her interests. Id.
Additionally, both contexts produce especially compelling evidence against the defendant.
Id. Also, these cases frequently occur in cases where law enforcement officers have a
unique opportunity to use significant amounts of compulsion against the defendant. Id.
175
See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
176
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985). This presumption is present no matter
where the interrogation is taking place. Therefore, the fact that the interrogation might
take place in a stationhouse, while the “knock and talk” takes place at a residence should
not be determinative.
177
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
178
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
179
See supra note 6 (describing the Wong Sun “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine).
180
It only represents a constitutional violation when the actual statement is used in court
against the accused. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306. Therefore, police are free to violate Miranda if
they do not mind the statement’s admissibility being taken away. Clymer, supra note 112,
171
172
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without a warning on the one hand, and disallow the results of police
interrogation on the other, where a warning was not given to the
suspect.181 Rather than remove Miranda protections, it would seem more
prudent to enhance the search protection afforded the subject in his
residence.182
Proponents of the “knock and talk” could argue that the Bostick and
Drayton decisions seem to place the “knock and talk” technique within
the realm of constitutional police actions. At first glance, the requests in
each case, on a bus in the middle of the passenger’s journey, being ruled
reasonable, would seem to indicate that any request in a person’s home
should be reasonable as well.183 However, if one looks deeper into the
Bostick and Drayton decisions, it becomes apparent that they compel no
such interpretation. First, while both Seibert and the “knock and talk”
involve police procedures specifically formulated to avoid constitutional
constraints, Bostick does not.184 As a result of this difference, police
intentionally avoiding the warrant requirement bring their actions into

at 450. In fact, it can be argued that this stance encourages the violation of Miranda where a
confession will make a plea bargain possible when it would not have been absent the
confession. Id. at 451 (calling the disregard for Miranda constitutional and sensible).
181
Both confessions and consent searches involve a suspect agreeing to forego rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and both involve the competing concerns of the legitimate
need for confessions and consent searches in law enforcement and the equally important
need to eliminate police misconduct. Simmons, supra note 13, at 795.
182
This also follows the philosophy regarding the sanctity of the home already
recognized by the Court. Justice Jackson summed up this philosophy in Brinegar v. United
States when he stated that Fourth Amendment freedoms
are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of
indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so
effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual
and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is
one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every
arbitrary government. . . . There may be, and I am convinced that there
are, many unlawful searches of homes and automobiles of innocent
people which turn up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is
made, about which courts do nothing, and about which we never hear.
Courts can protect the innocent against such invasions indirectly and
through the medium of excluding evidence obtained against those
who frequently are guilty.
338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949). See supra note 13 for further discussion.
183
This, of course, assumes identical police conduct. It also assumes that the request will
be interpreted by the resident as a request and not a command, which is questionable. See
SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 42, at 39-46.
184
The use of subjective factors in Bustamonte is misleading; the focus of Fourth
Amendment analysis is on police action and not the state of mind of the accused. See
Simmons, supra note 13, at 774, 779.
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question in the Seibert and “knock and talk” contexts.185 This difference
also confers a preference for the Seibert analysis of the “knock and talk”
being utilized, since both Seibert and the “knock and talk” involve law
enforcement’s attempt to work around constitutional protections.186
Second, both Bostick and Drayton have been criticized as being void of
practical considerations.187 As a result, it could be the time to overrule
them.
Further, in keeping with the tenants of the Bustamonte Court, the
“knock and talk” procedure must also be evaluated under coerced
confession precedent, and the precedent set forth in the Bustamonte
ruling itself.188 As a result, Part III.A.1 discusses the Court’s analysis in
Seibert.189
1.

The Seibert Plurality

The plurality in Seibert held that the goal of Miranda was to ensure
police tactics do not overbear the will of the accused.190 The Court then
noted that the goal of the question-first tactic employed by the police
was to render Miranda warnings ineffective.191 This aspect of the
question-first tactic is identical to the “knock and talk.” The goal in
using the “knock and talk” is to gain consent to search, and thereby
alleviate the need for a search warrant.192 But this legal shortcut has the

185
Officers admitted in the Ferrier decision that they conducted the “knock and talk” to
avoid getting a warrant. State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 932 (Wash. 1998). Indeed, that is the
principle advantage to the “knock and talk”—the avoidance of the hassle of getting a
warrant. See supra LAFAVE, supra note 5, at 4 (stating police attempt consent searches
because they believe the warrant requirement to be overly technical and time consuming);
see also Melton v. State, 705 N.E.2d 564, 568 (Ind. 1999) (Robb., J., concurring) (noting the
conduct of the police was troubling when conducting a “knock and talk”).
186
See infra notes 190-211 and accompanying text.
187
See Simmons, supra note 13, at 773 (noting that the Court’s rulings do not comport
with real life confrontations occurring on the street); Erica Flores, Note, “People, Not Places”:
The Fiction of Consent, The Force of Public Interest, and the Fallacy of Objectivity in Police
Encounters with Passengers During Traffic Stops, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1071, 1081 (2005) (“By
relying on the illusion that passengers can simply ignore the presence of the police, courts
approve of the sort of fishing expeditions the Fourth Amendment was designed to
prevent.”).
188
See supra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
189
See supra notes 134-67 and accompanying text.
190
Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2609 (2004).
191
Id.
192
See supra note 185 for examples of police using the “knock and talk” to avoid the
warrant requirement.
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effect of rendering the protection of the Fourth Amendment
ineffective.193
The plurality went on to describe five factors pertinent to the
evaluation of the voluntariness of the post-warning statement, and these
are useful in the “knock and talk” analysis.194 The first two factors noted
by the Seibert Court were the completeness and detail of the first prewarning set of questions, and the similar content of the two sets of
questions.195 The more detailed and complete those questions were, the
more it seemed that coercion was present.196 Further, if the content was
similar, the chance that the suspect would no longer believe he could
remain silent was increased. This technique tipped the psychological
scale too far in the police’s favor. The Court defined the inappropriate
behavior by the police as conducting an interrogation without a Miranda
warning, getting incriminating evidence, and then issuing the warning
when it will be least effective.197 By corollary, in the context of consent
searches, the behavior by police should be deemed inappropriate if they
do not give out information, or if they provide incomplete or deceptive
information in pursuit of consent.198
Within the realm of “knock and talk” consent searches, it is often the
case that the police do not give any explanation for the search, or the
explanation given is devious.199 By analogy, this deception or lack of
information relates to the facts of Bumper, when the Court held that
misrepresentations by the police represented coercion.200 Following the

“[P]hysical intrusion into the privacy of a person’s residence absent a warrant is the
primary evil that the Fourth Amendment seeks to eradicate.” Hadl v. State, 47 S.W.3d 897,
902 (Ark. App. 2001) (Griffen, J., concurring). The effectiveness of Fourth Amendment
protection is lessoned to a degree if all the police have to do to avoid it is to “bargain” for
consent.
194
See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612.
195
Id.
196
See supra note 145.
197
“The object of question-first is to render Miranda warnings ineffective by waiting for a
particularly opportune time to give them, after the subject has already confessed.” Seibert,
124 S. Ct. at 2610.
198
This is a primary reason some states have ruled that the “knock and talk” requires
informed consent; that is, the occupant must be informed of the right to refuse consent. See
supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
199
See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
200
See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968). This is especially true when
one considers the evidence that people often do not feel they can refuse a police request.
See supra note 3 (relating the uncertainty a professor of criminal procedure felt when police
came to her home to investigate a complaint); supra note 43 (describing the “no sane man
rule” and questioning why suspects continually grant consent to search with full
193
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Bumper Court, the presence of coercion precludes the presence of
consent.201 At a minimum, the validity of the consent given will be
called into question in court.202
Another factor that the Seibert Court found important was the
location of each set of questioning.203 The Court was persuaded by the
fact that both sets of questions took place at the station house, as that
would further indicate to the suspect that she was unable to retract her
previous statement.204 In this particular context, comparison to the
“knock and talk” is more difficult; it would be rare that a “knock and
talk” was conducted at one residence only to have the search take place
at a second residence.205
In this regard, the Court has held many times that police questioning
in the home, absent intimidation, is not coercive, as the suspect will feel
more at ease in the home setting than in the station house.206 While this
assertion is most likely true, it runs directly counter to the explicit
language in the Fourth Amendment regarding protection of the home.207
On the other hand, the language of the Fourth Amendment provides for
only protection against unreasonable searches, and that the Court has
stated consent searches are reasonable.
However, as a Federal Trade Commission regulation and other
Court rulings indicate, the mere act of asking for consent inside the home
is unreasonable.208 Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission has explicitly
knowledge incriminating evidence will be found); supra note 72 (discussing anecdotal
evidence that people comply with the uniform, not the request).
201
See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550.
202
See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 13, at 774 (stating that no outsider viewing interaction
would conclude that one would voluntarily consent to search when surrounded by police
in close quarters).
203
See Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2613, 2607 (2004).
204
See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
205
On the other hand, it is not totally out of the realm of possibility in the case of a
neighbor being present when police enter the home. This, however, is not within the scope
of this Note.
206
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
207
Physical intrusion into the privacy of the home without a warrant is the chief evil the
Fourth Amendment seeks to eradicate. Hadl v. State, 47 S.W.3d 897, 902 (Ark. App. 2001)
(Griffen, J., concurring).
208
See supra note 79 and accompanying text. If the home is truly a sacred place for
constitutional purposes, it should be protected from police intervention when they do not
have enough suspicion to get a search warrant. Otherwise, why would the police ever
bother to ask for a warrant if they can get consent? This renders the warrant requirement
toothless—over 90% of searches are already conducted under the auspices of consent. See
supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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stated, through regulation, that outsiders inside the home are coercive.209
Similarly, the Court has found the home setting to be worthy of a greater
level of protection in free speech jurisprudence.210 As both the Federal
Trade Commission and the Court have found the home worthy of
increased privacy protection, it becomes logical to extend that privilege
to the home search setting.
The last factor that the plurality in Seibert examined was the time
interval between the pre-warning and post-warning questioning.211 A
twenty-minute interval, the plurality ruled, did not provide enough of a
cooling-off period, and in fact, was merely a continuation of the
unwarned statement.212 Seen in the context of the “knock and talk,” this
tactic becomes even more intrusive. There are no warnings given. The
police come in, most of the time at night, under the guise of merely
“discussing” a situation. This “discussion” quickly turns into a request
for consent, often before the homeowner has time to completely digest
what has happened. If twenty minutes in a station house is not enough
time for a suspect to gather her senses, then it follows that an
instantaneous question in the home would not allow this either.
When the factors used by the Seibert plurality are applied to the
“knock and talk,” it becomes apparent that the “knock and talk” should
be categorized with the question-first/Mirandize later interrogation
tactic. Both techniques are utilized by law enforcement to evade
constitutional requirements put in place to secure our freedom.
2.

The Seibert Concurrences

Both Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy focused on the police intent
when writing their concurrences in Seibert.213 Even though their
positions have been criticized, they nonetheless deserve analysis in the

209
See supra note 80 and accompanying text. If door-to-door salesmen are so coercive as
to require a three day cooling-off period, why is the presence of law enforcement not
considered coercive? One dresses in plain clothes only armed with his product and
vocabulary. The other comes armed with a gun and the ability to take away your freedom
and liberty. The finding of coerciveness on the part of salesmen and not on the part of
police is illogical in this setting.
210
See supra note 78. Surely, if residential privacy is to be protected from even one
picketer, then it should be protected from police activity having even the appearance of
coerciveness.
211
Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2612 (2004).
212
Id. at 2613.
213
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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“knock and talk” context.214 The position of each concurring Justice
comports with the potential finding that the “knock and talk” is
presumptively coercive.
Justice Breyer would have allowed the question-first/Mirandize later
technique only when the failure to warn was a good faith failure and
was unintentional, whereas Justice Kennedy took this analysis one step
further, even allowing the intentional question-first/Mirandize later
when “curative measures” were employed during the interval between
the pre-warning and post-warning statements.215
Both of these analyses are appropriate for the “knock and talk.” It is
undisputed that the “knock and talk” is utilized for the direct purpose of
gaining consent, and therefore avoiding the requirements of the warrant
requirement.216 It has been argued that requiring a warning, similar to
Miranda, in the “knock and talk” context would be a curative measure.217
However, the taint of coerciveness would still surround the written
warning if other precautions were not in place.218 For one, the Seibert
Court found the Miranda warnings insufficient in that particular
context.219 There is no assurance that police will not find a way to
creatively insert the warning in the search context.220 Because the “knock
and talk” is an intentional attempt to avoid the warrant requirement, and
curative measures would not absolve the “taint,” the analysis from the
concurrences in Seibert results, again, in the “knock and talk” appearing
to be a coercive police tactic used to gain consent.

214
See Moreno, supra note 129, at 398 (describing the bad faith test, or intentional
disregard of Miranda, as shifting an impossible and inappropriate burden onto the
defendant, yet also describing federal courts already using the test).
215
See supra notes 157, 163 and accompanying text.
216
Indeed, in most instances, not only do the police seek to avoid the warrant
requirement, they could not get a warrant even if they wanted one because they lack
probable cause. See supra note 4.
217
See State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 933 (Wash. 1998); see also SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra
note 42, at 51.
218
For example, did the police use coercive tactics to get the warning signed? Or,
alternatively, was the warning signed before the search or after the search in an attempt by
the accused of mitigating any incriminating evidence found during the search?
219
Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2613 (2004) (“These circumstances must be seen as
challenging the comprehensibility and efficacy of the Miranda warnings to the point that a
reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes would not have understood them to convey a
message that she retained a choice about continuing to talk.”).
220
As an example, how effective would the warnings be in the case of our hypothetical,
when the officer is exploiting the suspect’s family situation to gain consent? What mother
would reasonably feel free to decline the request, if she feels her custody over her children
is threatened?
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The Seibert Dissent

Justice O’Connor’s dissent did not take issue with the factors used by
the plurality, but rather with the result of the plurality opinion.221
Specifically, Justice O’Connor would have remanded the case for a
determination of whether Seibert’s second confession was voluntarily
given.222
She saved the majority of her disagreement for the
concurrences, and the discussion of police intent in their analyses.223
According to Justice O’Connor, the intent of the police has no effect
on how the accused perceives the questioning.224 By extension, the same
logic would be used in the “knock and talk” analysis. The reason that
police choose to use the technique should have no impact on the finding
of coerciveness. Assuming, for the sake of argument this is true, it
nonetheless could leave the presumption of coerciveness. The technique
still takes place in the home, still mostly occurs at night, and still
involves unsupervised police action.225 Because Justice O’Connor agreed
with the factors utilized by the plurality, the same analysis used in that
section applies to the “knock and talk.” Thus, Justice O’Connor’s
analysis also comports with the potential finding of presumptive
coerciveness.
Utilizing the factors employed in the Seibert ruling, it has been
shown that the “knock and talk” technique has a dubious constitutional
basis. The logic behind all three groupings of Justices—the plurality, the
concurrences, and the dissent—has been used to show the troubling
nature of the “knock and talk.” However, the “knock and talk” also
needs to be analyzed under the Bustamonte reasoning and using the
“totality of the circumstances” surrounding the use of the technique.
B. Totality of the Circumstances Analysis
The language used by the Court in the Bustamonte decision indicated
that the totality of the circumstances has to be evaluated on a case-bycase basis.226 The Court explicitly stated that no one characteristic would
See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2620.
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
The actions of police in the field are ultimately supervised by judges; a group
admittedly loathe to find that the police lied. See supra note 100. If that is true, the taint of
coerciveness is still present whether the police intend to use the tactic or not. This
argument is thus beside the point.
226
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
221
222
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be outcome-determinative in regards to the coercion question.227 It thus
becomes somewhat more difficult to analyze a general proposition, such
as the coerciveness of the “knock and talk,” using case specific
characteristics. It can be done, however, using the reasoning in the
Court’s analysis that was based on the characteristics.
The Bustamonte Court stated that the totality of the circumstances
would show the voluntariness of the consent.228 In order to be
voluntary, the police tactics used to gain the consent must not have
“overborne the will” of the suspect.229 To apply these principals in a
general setting entails much of the Seibert argument made above.230
Police intend to overcome the will of the accused by the very nature of
the “knock and talk.” When a police officer negotiates for the consent
from the accused, he is essentially admitting that the accused would not
consent under normal circumstances.231 In other words, if the accused
was going to consent by a free will, no negotiation on the officer’s part
would be necessary. Many, including one Supreme Court Justice,
recognize the inherent difficulty society imposes on individuals if they
are expected to decline an officer’s request.232 Furthermore, some
civilians would believe that if they refused the request, it would only
arouse the officer’s suspicions and intensify the investigation; in fact,
officers have admitted that investigations are often intensified after a
refusal.233 This real world result runs counter to the Bostick Court’s
assumption in their findings of voluntariness.234

Id. at 226.
Id. at 227.
229
Id. at 226.
230
See supra notes 190-225 and accompanying text.
231
See supra note 12 (officer describing the warrant process as being tedious and
explaining that it is easier to obtain consent because he knows he can get that done).
232
See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 444-45 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating he
could not understand how the majority could possibly suggest that a bus passenger would
ever feel free to decline the officer’s search request); see also Simmons, supra note 13, at 80001 (noting the most frequent criticism of consent search cases is that the Court is unaware
of the realities on the street, where anytime an officer requests something, no matter how
innocently and politely she asks, the civilian feels a large amount of compulsion to
comply).
233
See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 447 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (declaring that intimidating shows
of authority on the part of police results in defendants reasonably believing that refusing
requests will arouse the officer’s suspicions, and noting that officers have admitted this is
the result of a refusal).
234
In the Bostick opinion, the Court noted that an individual may decline an officer’s
request without fear of prosecution. Id. at 437 (majority opinion). Further, the Court has
consistently ruled that a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal
level of justification needed for a seizure. Id.
227
228
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Additionally, as stated above, the Federal Trade Commission
requires a three day cooling off period when salesmen invade the home
to conduct business.235 The regulation specifically calls the cooling off
period a right of the purchaser.236 It is illogical to require a three day
cooling off period when a door-to-door salesman negotiates a sale, but
hold a negotiated consent valid when it occurs in a matter of minutes.237
Moreover, the Bustamonte Court ruled that the prosecution bore the
burden of proof regarding the voluntariness issue.238 It seems that, in
practice, current courts are not holding the prosecution to this burden.
When the voluntariness of consent comes down to a “shouting match,” it
is the tendency of courts to favor the law enforcement testimony.239 This
outcome is often due to the commonly held belief that the accused has a
large incentive to lie on the stand in an attempt to preserve his liberty.240
However, law enforcement has an equally great incentive to lie on the
stand.241 Specifically, the officer has three goals when testifying: he
wants to justify his search, preserve the evidence found, especially if that
evidence is critical to conviction, and maintain his reputation. As a
result, the effect of favoring law enforcement is a shift of the burden of
proof to the accused to prove consent was involuntary—a difficult, if not
often impossible proposition.242 If the only evidence that the prosecution
See supra note 86 for a description of the regulation granting the cooling off period.
16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (2005) (regulation requiring salesperson to notify the occupant of the
three day cooling off period when sales occur in the home).
237
Herbert Gaylord, Note, What Good Is the Fourth Amendment? “Knock and Talk” &
People v. Frohiep, 19 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 229, 239 (2002).
238
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
239
The phrase “shouting match” comes from the Strauss article. See supra note 91 and
accompanying text. Courts, many times, defer to police determinations. Flores, supra note
201, at 1096. By granting this deference, courts have removed all objectivity from their
review. Id. at 1094; see, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (holding that
the reasonable suspicion standard would allow officers to draw on their own experience
and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative
information available to them that might elude an untrained person); United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (stating that courts “should take care to consider whether
the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should
not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing”); United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1534
(10th Cir. 1996) (“We defer to ‘the ability of a trained law enforcement officer to distinguish
between innocent and suspicious actions.’” (quoting United States v. Figeroa, 44 F.3d 908,
912 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1029 (1995))).
240
See Robert H. Whorf, Consent Searches Following Routine Traffic Stops: The Troubled
Jurisprudence of a Drug Interdiction Program, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 27 (2001).
241
See supra note 98 and accompanying text (descriptions of law enforcement officials
“testilying”).
242
This is similar, again, to the confession context requiring the accused prove law
enforcement acted in bad faith. Moreno, supra note 129, at 398 (calling this requirement
difficult, if not impossible). Further, only obvious and egregious police misconduct will
235
236
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has regarding consent is the officer’s word, and his word is contested by
a coherent witness whose testimony is believable, it does not seem that
anything has been proven regarding consent. There is merely the
“shouting match,” and by accepting the officer’s word over that of the
other witness, the court is displaying a preference for police testimony.
However, if the testimony is looked at objectively, that search should be
ruled a violation of the Fourth Amendment because the prosecution has
not met its burden of proof due to each party having an incentive to lie.
Related to this burden of proof argument is a public policy argument
based on confidence in the judicial system. In cases where police officers
are allowed to get away with selective memory or lying on the stand, it
has the effect of ratification of error by the court.243 Specifically, the court
is endorsing the unconstitutional behavior of the police, which has the
derivative effect of eroding society’s confidence in the judicial system.244
Also, it could have the residual effect of the suspect’s will being
overborne during the “negotiation” phase. If a suspect does not believe
he has a chance of proving coercion in court, he most likely will not even
attempt to say no. This could go a long way in explaining why so many
people willingly grant consent when incriminating evidence is highly
likely to be found.245 That is, of course, assuming that they were willing
in the first place.
Finally, the development of Miranda case law shows a high
likelihood that the totality analysis will not function as a deterrent to
police to abstain from unconstitutional behavior.246 Indeed, the Miranda
warnings were put into effect because the Court felt the totality analysis
lead to a finding of involuntariness. Strauss, supra note 3, at 225. Professor Strauss read
every published consent case over a three-year period and concluded that a suspect’s
consent is almost always found to be voluntary; only in extreme cases of misconduct is the
consent found involuntary. Id. The conduct found to lead to a finding of involuntariness
generally was one of four instances: (1) threats to the subject or his family; (2) deprivation
of necessities; (3) a false assertion that the police had a right to search; or (4) an “unusual or
extreme show of force.” Id. at 223.
243
See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text (discussing “testilying” and selective
memory); see also Derrick Augustus Carter, A Restatement of Exceptions to the Preservation of
Error Requirement in Criminal Cases, 46 KAN L. REV. 947, 979 (1998) (discussing this
ratification of error in the preservation of errors for appellate review context).
244
See Simmons, supra note 13, at 775 (noting that the amount of condemnation of the
Court’s consensual search rulings threatens to undermine the integrity of judicial review of
police action); Strauss, supra note 3, at 252 (arguing for the abolition of consent searches
since “the determination of voluntariness is currently confused, misapplied, and based on a
fiction” which “raises significant concerns about the integrity of the judicial system”).
245
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
246
See supra notes 96-133 and accompanying text.
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was not doing enough to prevent coercive police tactics.247 Further, the
totality test caused a myriad of problems in the confession arena, and the
Court viewed Miranda as a solution to these problems.248 What is not
clear is why these same issues should not be expected when the totality
test is used in the search context. It could be argued that because the
search takes place in the home, there is a decreased chance for coercive
behavior due to the fact the accused is in a familiar setting.249 However,
there is often a greater chance for coercive behavior on the part of police
in the home.250 Children being present, the lack of videotape evidence,
and embarrassment from the police presence all serve the officer in
creating an atmosphere conducive to obtaining consent. Additionally,
children in the home give the officer leverage to negotiate for consent.
Further, audiotape can be turned on and off at the officer’s whim, and
curious neighbors may prompt many homeowners to grant consent just
to get the police out of public view. This loophole should not be
tolerated by a Constitution that explicitly prohibits unreasonable
searches of the home without a warrant supported by probable cause.251
IV. A CURE FOR THE “KNOCK AND TALK”
The previous analysis shows significant problems with the “knock
and talk” technique as currently employed. However, it is conceded that
consent searches and interviews in the home are necessary techniques
for law enforcement’s use. As a result, these two concurrent situations
require a nuanced rule recognizing the police necessity on the one hand,
and Fourth Amendment protections on the other.252 It is not desirable to
completely eliminate an effective and commonly used law enforcement
tool. However, it is extremely desirable to eliminate those instances
247
See supra note 106 and accompanying text. Additionally, the Court in Seibert
recognized that the Miranda warnings themselves were not a sufficient deterrent to police
misconduct. Moreno, supra note 129, at 399.
248
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
249
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 247 (1973) (holding the home is not an
inherently coercive setting).
250
[T]he Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not
be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert
force. For, no matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the
resulting ‘consent’ would be no more than a pretext for the unjustified
police intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is directed.
Id. at 228 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
251
See supra note 16; see also United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784, 789 (D.D.C. 1990)
(“In this ‘anything goes’ war on drugs, random knocks on the doors of our citizens’ homes
seeking ‘consent’ to search for drugs cannot be far away. This is not America.”). As has
been shown, we are already there.
252
Simmons, supra note 13, at 788.
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where the officer could develop probable cause and obtain a search
warrant but merely chooses not to.253
In other words, society has an interest in eliminating police
misconduct. This desire can be met in a relatively easy fashion with the
following proposed revised judicial test for consent searches in the home
resulting from “knock and talks.” The revised judicial test should
contain a presumption of coerciveness on the part of police when they
engage in a “knock and talk.” This will ensure that the burden of proof
remains on the prosecution, will protect residents against coercive police
behavior, and relieve the pressure on the judiciary to prefer police
testimony over the suspect’s.
Additionally, this presumption should not present too great a
burden on the prosecution. Similar to the preference for videotaping in
the Miranda context, there should be a preference for videotaping the
consent search when it results from the “knock and talk.” The main
benefit is that videotaping will allow the reviewing judge to observe the
totality of the circumstances. The circumstances surrounding the search
can be viewed directly by the judge instead of relying on testimony to
determine the totality of the circumstances. Further, the videotape
protects the police themselves from spurious accusations of coercion.
A. Presumption of Coerciveness
The first element of the proposed solution is a new judicial test. The
sanctity of the home in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence dictates that
these “knock and talk” searches should carry a presumption of
coerciveness. This presumption would provide three important benefits.
First, the presumption will recognize the importance society places on
the privacy of the home. Second, the presumption will ensure that the
burden of proof remains on the prosecution to prove voluntariness, or
reasonable police action. Third, the presumption will, in part, increase
the public’s confidence in the judicial system.
Currently, the Supreme Court, in various contexts, recognizes that a
warrantless search inside the home is the chief evil the Fourth
Amendment was designed to protect.254 This solicitude comes from the
language of the Fourth Amendment itself which specifically guards the
“right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . against

253
254

Strauss, supra note 3, at 264-65.
See supra notes 14, 43 and accompanying text.
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unreasonable searches and seizures.”255 Alternatively, the Court has also
stated that the home provides familiar surroundings enabling the
accused to feel free to end the police encounter.256 These differing
positions require reconciliation that the presumption of coercion can
provide. The point of the presumption is not that civilians can end the
encounter; it is that on some level they should not have to. The fact that
the search takes place in the home should receive heightened scrutiny if,
indeed, the privacy of the home deserves special Fourth Amendment
treatment. Additionally, the presumption of coerciveness will refocus
courts onto the protection of privacy the home deserves.
Moreover, the presumption of coerciveness will ensure that the
burden of proof remains on the prosecution.257 Courts must require
more than a police officer’s testimony that consent was obtained
reasonably. If the officer’s testimony is not contradicted by the accused,
then the presumption has been overcome. However, if believable
testimony has been offered by the accused opposing the officer’s
testimony, then the presumption has not been overcome.
The
prosecution must provide additional evidence to support the contention
that the search was consented to, which, in turn, ensures that the burden
remains on the prosecution.
Another identified issue that the presumption of coerciveness will
address is the tendency of courts to grant too much deference to the
testimony of a law enforcement officer.258 The presumption will
decrease the incentive for “testilying” by requiring the prosecution to
provide additional proof, and not merely relying on the officer’s
testimony.259 Furthermore, the presumption will decrease the effect
selective memory plays in the courtroom. This benefit will, in turn,
increase society’s confidence in the criminal justice system by leveling
the playing field inside of the courtroom. Civilian testimony being
treated equally with law enforcement testimony will engender a sense of
equality that increases trustworthiness and confidence in the result of
criminal trials.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Leonetti, supra note 4, at 297.
This statement is a combination of statements the Court has made in the Bustamonte,
Bostick, and Drayton cases. See supra notes 67-95 and accompanying text.
257
See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text for the discussion of the burden of proof
for consent.
258
See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
259
See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
255
256
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Additionally, the presumption of coerciveness will give more bite to
the “free to end the encounter” test put forth in Bostick and Drayton.260
The feeling of being treated equally in the courtroom and the resulting
confidence gain in the criminal justice system that the presumption
engenders will also allow civilians to feel more comfortable declining
police requests for consent to search. In this way, people will actually
feel free to end the encounter because they will have confidence that they
have a chance to compete equally in the courtroom, the ultimate review
of police behavior. This change will address the most frequent criticism
of consent cases: the Court’s interpretation of reality does not comport
with the reality on the streets.261
B. Meeting the Presumption: Videotaping the Encounter
While the presumption of coerciveness provides many corrections to
the problems encountered by the use of the “knock and talk” technique,
the prosecution needs reasonable means to overcome the presumption.
Therefore, to overcome the presumption of coerciveness, the police
should videotape the “knock and talk” encounter.
The main benefit of videotape evidence is that it eliminates the
“shouting match” in the courtroom.262 The judge, or jury, has the
evidence on display right in front of them, and can decide how coercive
the police action was using the best available information. While the
presumption itself can reduce the incentive for law enforcement to lie on
the stand, videotape evidence would eliminate it completely. Therefore,
instead of trying to decide who is more believable between the officer
and the accused, the judge can focus on what actually prompted the
consent to search. The best method to ensure the consent was granted
voluntarily, without police coercion, and in a reasonable manner, is for
the encounter to be videotaped by the police.263 This, of course, requires
that the video camera be turned on before entering the home and be kept
on during the search itself.264

260
See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text for the explanation and discussion of the
“free to end the encounter” test.
261
See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
262
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
263
See Moreno, supra note 129, at 399 (arguing that videotaping is the best method to
ensure custodial interrogations include Miranda warnings, and are free from coercion).
264
Otherwise, Miranda type problems could ensue. See supra notes 134-67 and
accompanying text for a description of the Seibert situation, one type of Miranda problem.
Also, if the video camera is turned on and off intermittently throughout the search the
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Furthermore, one reason Miranda warnings have gained a greater
level of societal confidence is that they are often videotaped.265 The
videotape allows the presiding judge to view body language, subtle
innuendos, facial expressions, and tone of voice in reviewing the totality
of the circumstances surrounding a confession. This review has the
effect of increasing confidence in judicial decisions, and by derivative,
increasing confidence in the criminal justice system itself. The effect
would be similar on the “knock and talk” technique if videotape
evidence was offered. The videotape would help reduce police
misconduct, improve the process of the “knock and talk,” and enhance
the judicial decision-making process. Shouting matches, as well as
“testilying” and misremembering by the police, would be eliminated by
the representative nature of the videotape evidence.
Lastly, the videotape would protect officers themselves from
spurious claims of police misconduct. The videotape would exonerate
the honest officer who has been wrongly accused of coercive behavior.
Again, the actions are recorded for posterity and show just what the
officer did and did not do. Similar to placing video cameras in squad
cars to videotape the actions of people pulled over for traffic violations,
the videotape will show the actions of the civilians inside of the home
and not allow a claim of misconduct where there was none.
However, in certain instances, the fact that the police are videotaping
could actually increase the coerciveness of the situation if the resident
feels apprehension at being subjected to a recording device. This feeling
in some residents would seem to argue against videotaping; however, on
balance, the benefits outweigh this limited detraction. First, the video
camera that this Note proposes is a button camera that would not be
visible to the occupant.266 Second, the protection to Fourth Amendment
rights afforded by the use of videotape is a greater benefit to society than
the limited increase in coercion some may feel when they see the video
camera, if one is seen at all.

value of the videotape evidence is lost because the judge is then dependant on testimony
only for descriptions of what occurred while the camera was off.
265
See supra note 95 and accompanying text. Also, one could foresee another argument
against videotaping—the cost of acquiring the equipment. The response to that argument
is that many times the equipment is already in squad cars for the protection of officers.
Another answer is that the cost is not significant. For less than $300, a button-hole video
camera could be installed on officers attempting the “knock and talk.”
See
http://www.cornerstonesecurityservices.com/st163.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2007) (Web
site selling covert video cameras).
266
See supra note 265 for the description of this camera.
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In summary, the presumption of coerciveness coupled with
videotape evidence will allow a valued and efficient police procedure to
continue and flourish. Confidence in the criminal justice system will be
increased, which should result in improved relations and cooperation
between law enforcement and civilians. Also, police conduct will be
preserved for judicial review which will protect police departments from
spurious misconduct claims.
V. CONCLUSION
As the “knock and talk” is currently interpreted by most states, our
hypothetical mother in the introduction will most likely have to live with
her consent to the search. The police will be allowed to get away with
conduct generally prohibited by the courts when they “bargained” for
the consent granted. Even if the mother protests the methods used by
police, the officers could very well testify that she gave consent willingly
and produce the signed consent form as proof. Most judges would be
persuaded by this evidence that the consent was voluntary and the
search reasonable.
As analyzed in this Note, however, the “knock and talk” has features
that render it unconstitutional as currently employed by the police. The
“knock and talk” erodes the sanctity of the home by allowing the police
admittance to the home using deception, and use the coerciveness of
their presence in the home to gain consent. Additionally, and too
frequently, the courts subtly shift the burden of proof to the accused to
show coerciveness on the officer’s part rather than hold the prosecution
to their duty of showing the consent was properly obtained. This is
principally, and most often, an unintentional result of judges being
loathe to finding that a police officer has lied on the stand when
recounting the circumstances surrounding the search. The resulting
“shouting matches” in the courtroom almost always result in victory for
the police.
Further, this Note has shown that the tactics employed by law
enforcement in the “knock and talk” are not reasonable, and need reining
in. The privacy and sanctity of the home must be protected, and the
presumption of coercion and videotaping of home consent searches will
accomplish this goal. The “knock and talk” is a tool the police use to
fight the war on drugs; however, this war should not support the
violation of the Constitution. The Court has said, “[i]f that war is to be
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fought, those who fight it must respect the rights of individuals, whether
or not those individuals are suspected of having committed a crime.”267
Marc L. Waite∗

267
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (referring to the war on drugs not justifying
every governmental action merely because the action is effective).
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